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Abstract
This study draws lessons from recent South African financial history. The period
covers the 2002/3 small bank crisis, the 2008 global financial crisis and the collapse
of African Bank in 2014.
During the small bank crisis, twelve banks experienced runs and a further
ten deregistered. In chapter 2, I use a monthly bank-level data set to show that
the failing banks were all solvent, but that their funding structure made them
fragile and susceptible to a confidence shock. The central bank did not intervene
to provide liquidity to the affected banks, worsening the crisis. The lessons are
that bank failures can impose both short- and long-term economic costs, monetary
policy can have financial stability implications, and that a credible and clear bank
resolution strategy is critical.
South Africa did not experience any bank failures during the 2008 global
financial crisis period. In chapter 3, I show that this is partly because the banking
regulator increased capital adequacy ratios during the pre-crisis period, in response
to rapid credit growth. The lesson is that macroprudential tools can reduce credit
growth and dampen overheating financial cycles.
In chapter 4, the successful bail-in of creditors in African Bank during 2014
provides lessons on the intended and unintended consequences of post-global finan-
cial crisis bank resolution tools. Money-market funds ‘broke the buck’, triggering
significant redemptions and some financial spillovers. The authorities required
discretionary liquidity restrictions and market-making facilities. The lesson is that
– correctly applied – new resolution tools can support the sustainable restructuring
of a failing bank, reduce financial spillovers, and minimise taxpayers losses.
The conclusion points to broader lessons from the whole period, particularly
the primary importance of a coordinated monetary and financial stability policy
framework.
iii
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Opsomming
In hierdie studie word lesse uit Suid-Afrika se onlange finansiële geskiedenis on-
dersoek. Die studie dek die tydperk vanaf die ineenstorting van Saambou in 2002,
en die gevolglike kleinbankkrisis, tot die mislukking van African Bank in 2014.
Tydens die kleinbankkrisis het twaalf banke banklope ervaar en nog tien is
gederegistreer. In hoofstuk twee wys ek, met behulp van ’n maandelikse bankvlak-
datastel, dat dié mislukte banke almal solvent was maar dat hul befondsingstruk-
ture hulle oop gelaat het vir ’n geloofwaardigheidskrisis. Die sentrale bank het
nie ingetree om likwiditeit aan hulle te verleen nie, wat die krisis vererger het.
Die lesse is dat bankmislukkings kort- én langtermyn ekonomiese gevolge inhou,
dat monetêre beleid finansiële stabiliteit kan beïnvloed, en dat geloofwaardige en
duidelike strategieë vir bankresolusies onmisbaar is.
Tydens die wêreldwye finansiële krisis van 2008 het Suid-Afrika geen bankmis-
lukkings ervaar nie. Hoofstuk drie wys dat dit deels daaraan toe te skryf is
dat die bankreguleerder in die tydperk voor die krisis kapitaaltoereikendheidsver-
houdings verhoog het in antwoord op vinnige kredietgroei. Die les is dat makro-
omsigtigheidsmaatreëls kreditgroei kan beperk en oorverhittende ekonomiese sik-
lusse kan demp.
In hoofstuk 4 verskaf die suksesvolle ‘in-redding’ (‘bail-in’) van krediteure van
African Bank in 2014 lesse aangaande die bedoelde en onbedoelde gevolge van
bankresolusiemaatreëls wat ontwikkel is na die wêreldwye finansiële krisis. Geld-
markfondse het noodontrekkings ervaar, wat beduidende aflossings en finansiële
uitkringeffekte tot gevolg gehad het. Die owerhede het diskresionêre likwiditeits-
beperkings en mark-maak fasiliteite vereis. Dit les is dat – korrek toegepas – nuwe
bankresolusiemaatreëls die volhoubare herstrukturering van ’n bank kan bevorder,
end die finansiële uitkringeffekte en die kostes vir belastingbetalers verminder.
Die slothoofstuk trek breër lesse uit die hele periode, veral die primêre belang
van ’n gekoördineerde monetêre en finansiële stabiliteitsbeleidsraamwerk.
iv
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Bank failures can impose significant economic losses. Even relatively small
failures have led to large, and often unexpected, financial burdens on individuals,
governments and society. Internationally, the ten most expensive episodes have
been associated with fiscal losses of between 40 and 60 per cent of gross domestic
product (Laeven and Valencia, 2013). Recovery from these losses can be slow.
In a review of one hundred systemic banking crises, Reinhart and Rogoff (2014)
estimate that it takes, on average, eight years for an affected economy to recover to
its pre-crisis income level. The decade-long economic recovery from the 2008 global
financial crisis is ongoing, and it has been protracted, complex and ‘strikingly more
tepid’ than previous recoveries (Bordo and Haubrich, 2017).
The sharp fall in output, rise in unemployment, and substantial reprioritisation
of fiscal resources can have long-lasting political implications. There is evidence
that financial and economic crises often precipitate political change, leading to a
decline in democracy (Gasiorowski, 1995; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005; Adam
and Karanatsis, 2018). In a review of 800 general elections in twenty advanced
economies over 140 years, Funke et al. (2016) show that financial crises lead to an
increase in the number of votes for far-right parties of about a third. The majorities
held by governing parties decline, parliaments become more fragmented and there
is an increase in street protests and riots. The system of financial regulation is
thus important, and its effects are ‘non-neutral’ (Blanchard et al., 2010).
Against this background, there is a rich international literature on financial
2
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1.1. The international context 3
crises and banking failures. In contrast, comprehensive analyses of South African
bank failures are limited. Three of the most notable global surveys of banking
crises, Caprio and Klingebiel (2003), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and Laeven and
Valencia (2013), either misdate or omit the most significant South African failures.1
This study partially fills the gap. It fits into a broader research programme on
the history of South African financial crises – complementing a study of a financial
crisis in the Dutch Cape Colony (Havemann and Fourie, 2015) and the sovereign
crisis of 1985 to 1990, when interest payments on government debt were suspended
(Havemann, 2014).
1.1 The international context
Economic and financial crises have led to a better understanding of the central
bank’s role in preventing bank failures, and managing failures when they occur.
The 2008 global financial crisis provided particularly important lessons for central
banks. One of the triggers of the crisis was a disorderly collapse in asset prices,
particularly house prices, during the course of late 2006 and 2007.2 Through a
1Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, 346) draw from existing literature to identify South African
banking crises in 1877 and 1890 but do not elaborate on them, and then mention only a further
two: in 1977-78 (‘Trust Bank’) and ‘some banks’ in 1989. In their extensive database of banking
crises, Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) list ‘Trust Bank’ in 1977; and merely provides ‘1989’ with a
question mark. Laeven and Valencia (2013) list South Africa without any bank failures. These
three studies both misdate South African bank failures and exclude significant periods of distress.
The 1877 and 1890 dates in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) are only two of a number of ‘banking
panics’ experienced during the late nineteenth century (Arndt, 1928; Jones, 1999; Verhoef, 2009).
A small bank crisis took place in the mid 1970s (Koseff, 1984). The International Monetary
Fund systemic failures database contained in Laeven and Valencia (2013) does not record two
systemically important banks receiving substantial state assistance – Trust Bank in the late 1970s
and Bankorp during the late 1980s, nor does it include the 1970s and 2002/3 small bank crisis.
2Dating the crisis is difficult. In much of the (particularly popular) literature, it is dated as
15 September 2008, the day that Lehman’s Brothers, a large investment bank, failed. However,
Lehman’s was only one of a number of financial institutions in distress. The two government-
backed mortgage providers, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, went into rescue on 7 September 2008,
after a few months of difficulties. One day before Lehman’s, on 14 September, Merrill Lynch was
sold to Bank of America in an attempt to staunch potential contagion. A day after Lehman’s,
on 16 September, Reserve Primary Fund, a large money-market fund ‘broke the buck’, i.e. had
a capital writedown. Then, on 17 September, the Federal Reserve lent American International
Group (AIG) US$85 billion to avoid its liquidation. A nine-day bank run on Washington Mutual
led it its collapse on 25 September 2008.
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4 Chapter 1. Introduction
network of complex interlinkages, the house price collapse fed through to banks
and non banks.
The effects of the asset price collapse challenged the prevailing intellectual
orthodoxy of the time, the ‘Bernanke-Gertler consensus’, that ‘inflation-targeting
central banks need not respond to asset prices, except insofar as they affect
the inflation forecast’ (Bernanke and Gertler, 2001). The way this intellectual
consensus was executed in practice is perhaps best summarised by the approach
of Alan Greenspan, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve between 1987 and 2006.
The ‘Greenspan Standard’ (Blinder and Reis, 2005) became known as the ‘mop
up after strategy’ or ‘clean, don’t lean’ – asset-price bubbles should be allowed to
burst, and after they had burst, monetary policy should be used to protect the
system from the fallout (‘clean’). Most importantly, monetary policy should not
be adjusted ex ante to dampen (or ‘lean’ against) perceived asset-price bubbles.
In retrospect, the Greenspan Standard contributed to the credit-fuelled bubble
in asset prices that eventually burst (Saayman, 2010; Borio, 2014; Eichengreen,
2017). This credit-fuelled boom created the impression of a strong economic
expansion, but it masked unhealthy fundamentals including that the United States
had a large current-account deficit while other parts of the world (particularly
China) had large surpluses. This led to a structural flow of savings from the
developing world into the United States and other advanced economies. This
largely obscured a weak savings rate in the developed world, and created the
impression that the rapid growth in investment and consumption growth was
sustainable.
The long, apparently benign global expansion (the ‘Great Moderation’) of 2000
to 2007 had created the illusion that the questions of macroeconomic stabilisation
policy had been answered. In his presidential address at the 2003 American Eco-
nomic Association meetings, Lucas Jr (2003) argued that macroeconomic’s ‘central
problem of depression prevention has been solved, for all practical purposes, and
has in fact been solved for many decades.’ By 2007, Goodfriend (2007) stated
that the ‘disarray’ of macroeconomics had finally ended. Looking back to this
intellectual optimism, Eichengreen (2017) draws a parallel with the ‘New Era’ –
the long boom of the 1920s. The two boom periods, eighty years apart, had a
number of common features. In particular, during both, the strong economy and
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low interest rates encouraged increased risk taking and politically well-connected,
profitable banks discouraged any attempt at tightening of financial regulation,
despite concerns about rising asset prices and risks.
The Greenspan Standard had important implications for the institutional struc-
ture of central banks and the financial regulatory function. The role of central
banks in the financial system and financial regulation became less important.
The interest-rate setting function occupied most of central banks’ resources and
intellectual time (Goodfriend, 2007; Nier, 2009; Turner, 2009). Goodhart (2011)
quotes Lord Cobbold’s statement that ‘a Central Bank is a bank, not a study
group’, and notes that the crisis highlighted that the central bank’s primary
responsibility is liquidity and financial stability, not interest-rate setting.3 This
was despite warnings that the culture of the new regulatory authorities could
become more focused on legal compliance, rather than on analysing the risks to
systemic stability.4
Without a financial stability focus, regulators did not continually assess poten-
tial risks to financial stability, particularly those posed by a plethora of new and
complex financial instruments and financial innovation, including, but not limited
to, collateralised debt obligations, mortgage-backed securities, structured notes,
credit default swaps, and complex securitisations. There was an almost naïve
belief in the ability of sophisticated and experienced market participants to assess
the risks posed by these instruments.
The Greenspan Standard was also an ahistoric understanding of the role of
central banks (Du Plessis, 2012), which had been created as financial stability
institutions, not monetary policy institutions.5 Most central banks only assumed
3This was particularly notable in the United Kingdom. In 1997, the Bank of England was
granted independence in the setting of interest rates. At the same time, the banking regulation
function was also shifted to the Financial Services Authority. The role of the Bank thus changed
significantly.
4See Goodhart (2002)’s prescient warning before the crisis and Turner (2009)’s post-mortem.
Turner (2009) concludes that in the United Kingdom, shifting banking supervision out of the
central bank hampered the coordination between the Bank of England and the new banking
regulator (the Financial Services Authority).
5The founding objective of the Federal Reserve was ‘to furnish an elastic currency, to afford a
means of rediscounting commercial paper, and to establish a more effective supervision of banking
in the United States.’ (Goodfriend and King, 1988). See also Capie et al. (1994). In contrast,
Goodfriend (2007) sets out the consensus circa 2007 as having four main pillars – all of which
relate to the setting of interest-rates and inflation. His paper on the consensus is notable in that
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the role of the independent setting of interest rates during the late 1990s and early
2000s. Even a cursory reading of Friedman and Schwartz (1963), for example,
leads one to conclude that a central bank’s core responsibility must in some way
include bank system health, and concerns about how asset price rises could affect
that. One of these historical roles was the lender of last resort function – the
traditional role for the central bank to be the ultimate liquidity backstop to the
banking system.6
The consequence was that central bank models largely excluded asset price
fluctuations, did not include financial frictions or have large financial sectors
(Du Plessis, 2010), and relied heavily on rational expectations (Saayman, 2011).
As as result, central banks did not consider the impact of asset prices in the
formulation of monetary policy. This was despite a relatively well-developed
literature on the credit and balance balance sheet channels of monetary policy
(Bernanke and Blinder, 1988, 1992; Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Kashyap and
Stein, 1995; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Bernanke et al., 1999).7 Moreover there
was an understanding of the potential interaction between low inflation and the
build-up of financial imbalances (see, for example, the prescient paper by Borio
and Lowe (2002)).
The under-specification of models also led to a misunderstanding of the inter-
action between monetary policy and asset markets. Taylor (2009), for example,
argues that monetary policy had been too loose in the period leading up to the
crisis. Borio and Zhu (2012) proposes a formal channel for the mechanism by
which loose monetary policy might create credit bubbles, the ‘risk-taking channel
of monetary policy’, echoing earlier work by Rajan (2006). In this view, low
interest rates create increased risk appetite encouraging a ‘search of yield’ (see
also Diamond and Rajan (2009)).
Taylor’s critique is notable in that he shows that the Federal Reserve kept
it does not mention financial stability once. He does, however, note the inflationary consequences
of the liquidity that the Fed provided to the system following the 1987 stock market collapse.
6Kindleberger (1996) notes that ‘Many high-minded principles suffer from entropy or decay
over time, and the lender of last resort may be one of them’. He highlights the long history of
the lender of last resort function – it is often ascribed to William Bagehot who described it in
1876. However, the idea can be traced back to Sir Francis Baring and Henry Thornton following
a series of crises in the late eighteenth century, particularly one in 1793.
7This literature is discussed in more detail in chapter 3.
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interest rates artificially low, even within a strict rules-based inflation-targeting
framework. The implication is that the Federal Reserve misunderstood the na-
ture of the pre-crisis boom – believing that potential growth was structurally
higher. Indeed, Greenspan himself appeared to think that technological progress
had structurally accelerated economic growth. Moreover, there is evidence of an
asymmetry in how inflation targeting was applied in practice. During period of
low inflation, central banks were less inclined to raise rates even with evidence
of an asset price bubble – as Issing (2011) notes: ‘policy forbearance vís-á-vís
dis-inflationary forces fuels financial exuberance and financial exuberance in turn
creates financial imbalances.’
Perhaps to the surprise of central bankers, politically central banks were ‘blamed’
for the 2008 global financial crisis (Geithner, 2014; King, 2016). This was in part
because central banks then, as now, fulfilled a number of additional functions which
are necessary but not sufficient conditions for financial stability, e.g. management
and oversight of the payment system, issuing and distribution of currency and
banker to the government. The supervision of the banks that precipitated the
2008 financial crisis, however, did not lie with the central bank. In the United
Kingdom, Northern Rock was supervised by the Financial Services Authority and,
in the United States, Washington Mutual was supervised by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation.8
1.2 The contribution
With this well-known international experience in mind, the contribution of this
study is to draw lessons from much less researched South African bank failures
and periods of financial distress.
Against the background of a limited South African literature, in chapter 2,
8Geithner (2014), for example, discusses the problems that this created in the US when
Washington Mutual failed. In particular, Washington Mutual was under the supervision of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The FDIC was in favour of a simple closing of
the bank, whereas, by Geithner’s account, the Treasury and the Federal Reserve were correctly
concerned about the knock-on effects. Turner (2009) and King (2016) make a similar points
about the failure of Northern Rock. The regulator did not have a financial stability focus and
was of the view that Northern Rock posed little risk.
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I examine the small bank crisis of 2002/3. The crisis began with the failure of
Saambou bank in February 2002. A series of bank runs followed, and within weeks
the nation’s fifth largest bank (Board of Executors) had failed. In total 22 banks
closed, half the banks by number and 10 per cent by size. I show that it was a pure
liquidity crisis – affected banks were solvent and well-capitalised, but had fragile
funding structures.
The crisis took place in the early years of the ‘Greenspan Standard’, and the
central bank’s response reflects this. It did not provide liquidity to the affected
banks. In contrast, concerned about the inflationary implications of an exchange-
rate depreciation, the central bank raised interest rates as the crisis unfolded.
There is no empirical evidence on the balance sheets of individual banks that any
of the failing banks received liquidity assistance.
The failure is also relatively unique internationally – South Africa did not have
deposit insurance in place, making it one of the few modern uninsured bank runs;
depositors had extensive ex ante information; and the affected banks were solvent
and well capitalised.
Beyond the historical contribution, the chapter also underscores the role of
a central bank to stabilise the financial system through periods of substantial
liquidity stress, and the importance of a coherent and consistent approach between
the financial stability function and the monetary policy function. I show that these
two functions cannot operate in isolation from one another.
The contribution of chapter 3 is to provide a case study of a period where
a central bank ‘leaned’ rather than ‘cleaned’. In the run-up to the 2008 global
financial crisis, in common with most of the world, South Africa experienced a
long economic boom with low inflation. Between 2002 and 2007, average economic
growth was 4.6 per cent. Inflation was comfortably inside the target range, av-
eraging 4.2 per cent. Yet credit growth was particularly strong, in hindsight at
historic and unsustainable highs. Private sector credit extension growth averaged
17.5 per cent during the period, and house price growth was 20.2 per cent. By all
measures, the financial cycle was reaching an unsustainable (in retrospect) peak.
In contrast to other jurisdictions, the banking supervisor responded by raising
capital adequacy levels. I show that this constrained credit extension which, in
turn, dampened the financial cycle. The banking sector thus entered the 2008
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global financial crisis period better capitalised than banks in other jurisdictions.
When the crisis hit, asset price growth slowed, but there was no disorderly collapse
in any major market.
Amongst the lessons of the global financial crisis was that small failures can
have substantial knock-on effects, particularly through a complex web of non-bank
financial intermediaries. This forms the backdrop for chapter 4.
Following the failure of African Bank, over fifteen money market funds ‘broke
the buck’, i.e. registered capital writedowns. This was the largest and most
significant such episode since Reserve Primary Fund broke the buck the day after
Lehman Brothers failed. The potential for a disorderly and extensive financial
market dislocation occupied the minds of the authorities during the collapse of
African Bank in 2014, a monoline lender funded almost entirely by mutual funds.
The authorities deployed a set of post-crisis bank resolution tools during the
curatorship of the bank. In particular, the claims of bond holders were written
down. I show that the use of a mix of tools during the episode successfully reduced
the knock-on effects on the rest of the financial system. The bank was successfully
split into a new ‘good bank’ and the residual bank has slowly been liquidated.
The chapter contributes to the nascent literature on the use of new resolution
tools, providing one of the earliest demonstrations of how the post-crisis tools can
be deployed to reduce systemic risk.
1.3 The methodological approach
Some will argue, I suspect, that the approaches of economists and
economic historians differ not at all, or that they differ only in that
historians use dustier data. Naturally, I will push back against this
view. I will argue that the historian’s approach differs in that it
pays more attention to context, to politics and to institutions when
evaluating both the formulation and effects of monetary policy.
Eichengreen (2014)
The study is in the tradition of the work of Friedman and Schwartz (1963);
Capie et al. (1994); Calomiris and Gorton (1991); Eichengreen and Mitchener
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(2004); Calomiris (2008); Reinhart and Rogoff (2009); Goodhart (2011); Iyer et al.
(2012); Eichengreen (2014, 2017) and others, which draw lessons for modern-day
central banking and bank regulation from lessons from the experience of the past,9
particularly case studies on bank failures and the response to those failures.
The approach is an empirical historical one, following the ‘data revolution’ in
the approach to economic history and cliometrics (Fourie, 2016, 2018).
Each chapter takes a different empirical approach. Chapter 2 applies various
econometric and machine learning techniques to a new large bank-level data set
of 244,776 observations for the 2002 to 2003 period. In chapter 3, I extend
the National Treasury’s existing macroeconometric model to include the capital
adequacy ratio as a policy lever. In chapter 4 I apply panel and other econometric
techniques to three mutual fund data sets of quarterly and daily data on mutual
funds, including data down to a financial-instrument level.
The remainder of the thesis is structured chronologically, and the dissertation
begins with the small bank crisis of 2002/3.
9I joined the National Treasury in 2002, and have been close to each of the episodes I cover in
this study. While I have attempted a dispassionate empirical study of the period, I cannot hide
my own observations of the events. I will return to some of these in the dissertation’s conclusion.
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The South African small bank crisis
of 2002/3
Following the failure of Saambou bank in February 2002, another seven banks
failed within a month, including the fifth-largest, and a further five within a year.
In total, twenty-two small and mid-sized banks deregistered over two years: half
the total number of banks, and nearly 10 per cent of the deposit base. The banks
that failed were all well capitalised and solvent, but had relatively high levels of
short-term funding from non-bank financial institutions. The central bank did not
intervene to provide liquidity and, concerned about the inflationary consequences
of an exchange rate depreciation, it raised interest rates.
2.1 Introduction
The small bank crisis of 2002/3 began with a run on Saambou bank, then South
Africa’s seventh-largest. In the second half of January 2002 alone, Saambou’s
retail deposits fell R861 million – 8.8 per cent of all the banks retail deposits, and
5.6 per cent of its liabilities.1 Estimates vary, but between the start of the run in
mid-January and curatorship five weeks later, total outflows were nearly 20 per
cent of Saambou’s deposits.2
1Unless otherwise indicated, the data for this section was obtained from the data sets
described in section 2.5 below. The exact scale of the run between the end of January and the
curatorship a week later is difficult to determine precisely. This is because the bank’s deposits
were initially frozen, and then limited withdrawals were allowed.
2At the conclusion of the curatorship in August, individual deposits were R6.82 billion,
suggesting the five-week run could have been as large as R2.9 billion, or 19.2 per cent of Saambou’s
11
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The proximate trigger of the run was the announcement on 15 January 2001 by
South Africa’s then largest bank, ABSA, of significant losses in its microlending
subsidiary Unifer. Unifer’s non-performing loan provisions were increased by
R1.78 billion. The net effect was a R1.045 billion reduction in ABSA’s capital,
approximately 10.9 per cent of its capital base.3 Saambou had a very similar clien-
tele to Unifer, suggesting depositors were concerned about ‘common exposures.’4
Saambou had grown rapidly – assets grew by 34.8 per cent in 1999 alone – mainly
in unsecured lending.
Table 2.1: Deposit balances, individuals, Saambou, R bn
Rbn Term Outflow (%*)
Cash Short Medium Long Total ∆ Total
31-Dec-2001 0.499 1.268 0.018 8.007 9.792 -
31-Jan-2002 0.524 1.234 0.028 7.145 8.932 -0.861 -5.6%
Conclusion 0.524 1.234 0.028 5.033 6.820 -2.973 -19.2%
* Percentage of deposits
Source: Bank Supervision monthly statistics
The run was concentrated amongst informed depositors with large balances,
who declined to roll over their long-term deposits when the notice period expired.
The effect was the same as that of a run, with long-term deposits falling quickly
(see Table 2.1).5 To cover the gap between its assets and liabilities, Saambou
accessed interbank funding. Interbank deposits rose from R247 million to R1.027
total deposits (see Table 2.1). Press reports variously state that the run was between R1 billion
and R2 billion.
3The sudden impact of the news caused ABSA shares to fall by 21 per cent over the course
of the day, ultimately closing 16.4 per cent weaker. The banking sector as a whole fell 5.2 per
cent. Sanlam, at that stage a 22.8 per cent shareholder in ABSA, fell 5.2 per cent.
4In contrast to Saambou, Unifer was almost exclusively a microlender, but both had been
persistently understating their losses.
5Press reports indicated that the run began with a run on attorney trust funds. Lawyers
evidently had had heard rumours that the bank was in difficulty. However, the data neither
confirms nor counteracts this claim. Outflows were concentrated in the ’individuals’ depositor
category (line 23 of the DI-900 bank statistics). Attorneys hold trust money on behalf of
individual clients and so for recordkeeping purposes, they appeared to be treated as individuals.
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billion, an increase of R782 million, suggesting it obtained money from another
bank to make good the shortfall.6 Liquidity moved in the system from Saambou
to larger banks.7
From Monday, 4 February 2002, the Saambou share price began to fall rapidly.
On Wednesday, 6 February, the intraday share price declined by 46 per cent. It
recovered slightly, but ended the day 23 per cent lower. Saambou, however, faced
continued deposit outflows and its liquidity position became almost impossible to
sustain. It was clearly accessing lending from other banks to cover the shortfall,
and these banks were increasingly reluctant to provide liquidity.
During the course of the week, Investec, the largest shareholder, proposed a
bail-out package to the authorities, which the authorities declined (Mittner, 2003a).
By the end of the week, the bank’s financial position became impossible to sustain.
The curatorship (statutory management) of the bank was announced by Trevor
Manuel, the then Minister of Finance on Saturday, 9 February 2002.
2.1.1 Spillovers
The first wave: Sharp runs in March/April 2003
The Saambou curatorship announcement triggered concerns about other small
banks. Following the announcement, seven banks immediately experienced runs:
BOE Bank, Merrill Lynch, TA Bank, Cadiz, FirstCorp, PSG Investment Bank and
International Bank. These banks collectively made up approximately 6.6 per cent
of total deposits as at February 2002, with BOE alone comprising 6.5 per cent of
deposits.
The BOE run was the most serious. Between the beginning of February and
the end of June 2002, BOE liabilities shrank by R8.5 billion, or 17.9 per cent. Of
6Matching data from other banks shows that it was most likely FirstRand, which saw a large
increase in exposures to other banks over the month (more than R1.44 billion). Surprisingly,
it does not appear to be Investec, which at the time owned 41 per cent of Saambou through
Fedsure.
7At an aggregate level there was a small decrease in deposits by individuals of R1.6
billion. This was approximately 1 per cent of total individual deposits of, which totaled R158
billion. Total deposits (including individuals, government, corporations, etc.) actually increased
substantially by R22.9 billion, more than half of which was as a result of an unexpected increase
in deposits by other private sector financial institutions of R13.7 billion.
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Figure 2.1: Number of banks, 1994 - 2008
The number of South African registered banks, mutual banks and foreign banks first increased
following liberalisation from 1994. However, the Saambou curatorship (dotted line) precipitated
a substantial consolidation.
Source: Bank Supervision Department, Annual Reports
this outflow, the largest was by individuals, who withdrew R5.5 billion, followed
by other private sector financial institutions, which withdrew R4.5 billion. As with
Saambou, BOE accessed interbank funding to make up the shortfall – interbank
deposits rose by R3.5 billion. There were net small outflows in other categories.
The authorities provided emergency liquidity assistance to BOE to stabilise
the system. A full guarantee of all its assets was provided to BOE on 14 March
2002. BOE was able to continue operating albeit in substantial distress, while
a purchase and assumption agreement was negotiated with Nedbank. It was
ultimately absorbed into Nedbank, and it deregistered a year later.
At the same time as the run on BOE, the other six banks also experienced runs.
At the time, these banks made up 0.11% of the total systemwide deposits. Their
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(a) Banks that deregistered during the ‘First
Wave,’ i.e. April 2002.
(b) Banks that deregistered during the ‘Second
Wave,’ i.e. October to Dec 2002.
Figure 2.2: Deposits, failed banks, % system-wide deposits
The ‘First Wave’ of affected banks saw sharp outflows, while the ‘Second Wave’ of affected banks
saw large, but slightly more gradual declines in their deposit base. Both waves, however, were
already experiencing outflows by the time Saambou failed. The vertical line indicates the date
of the Saambou curatorship.
entire deposit base was impacted by the run, and by the end of March 2002, the
combined deposit base of these banks was nearly zero, as shown in the left-hand
panel of Figure 2.2. With the exception of PSG Investment Bank, all these banks
deregistered during the course of April 2002.8
8As noted in Table 2.2, PSG Investment Bank deregistered officially a year later, in April
2003. This was due in part to the attempted restructuring of the bank by a larger group; actions
included buying Real Africa Bank. However, because it was affected by the run, it is counted as
part of this group.
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Table 2.2: Timeline of cancellations and curatorships
Date Affected bank % Total
deposits
(at Feb 2002)
Jan 2002 Unifer announces large loss
Feb 2002 Saambou* 2.30%
First wave
Sharp runs
Mar 2002 BOE** 6.51%
Apr 2002 Merrill Lynch, TA Bank, Cadiz, FirstCorp,
International Bank, PSG Inv Bank*** 0.11%
Second wave
Slow runs
Sep 2002 Brait Merchant Bank 0.16%
Nov 2002 Corpcapital 0.15%
Dec 2002 Old Mutual Bank 0.04%
Feb 2003 SECIB Bank 0.02%
Mar 2003 Unibank 0.34%
Cumulative 9.63%
Third wave
Consolidation
Feb 2003 Nedcor Investment and Cape of Good Hope
incorporated under Nedbank licence†
July 2003 ING Bank and Rand Merchant Bank deregister
Sept 2003 African Merchant Bank deregisters
This table reflects the dates of curatorship or deregistration, not the date that runs began. In
most cases, runs on these banks began earlier. In some cases, liabilities began shrinking before
the Saambou collapse. For this reason, a more accurate dating technique is provided in Table
2.5.
* Saambou was placed into curatorship on 9 February 2002. Deregistration only occured towards
the end of 2003, once the bank had been fully wound up.
** BOE was given a full going concern guarantee plus emergency liquidity assistance on 14
March 2002. Deregistration, however, only occured in March 2003 when the bank merged with
Nedbank.
*** PSG Investment Bank was restructured as part of a comprehensive restructuring of the PSG
group. It only formally deregistered in April 2003. For a discussion, see PSG Limited (2003).
† See discussion in section 2.1.1
Source: Annual Report of the Registrar of Banks, 2002 and 2003
The second wave: Slow runs in September 2002 to February 2003
A second wave of bank cancellations took place between September 2002 and
February 2003. These banks had significant shareholders and diversified busi-
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nesses. However, they were not able to counteract the liquidity pressures in the
market at the time, and a general loss of confidence.
Brait Bank cancelled its licence on 30 September 2002, having given sharehold-
ers notice of its intention to cancel already in May 2002. It used the period between
May and September to slowly wind up the banking business and restructure its
assets into a new financial services company (ING Barings, 2002).
The next banks to fail were Corp Capital (29 November), Old Mutual Bank
(17 December) and SECIB (end of December). All of these banks experienced
depositor outflows as confidence dissipated. The final bank in this group was
Unibank. Its depositor behaviour was somewhat unique. It had experienced a
short sharp outflow of half of its deposits in April 2002, before briefly stabilising.
Over the next year, there appears to be a slow outflow of the remaining liabilities
and the bank became increasingly unsustainable, leading to its winding up. It
deregistered on 31 March 2003.
The third wave: consolidation and clean-up, February 2003 onward
From February 2003, a further set of banks closed, either through mergers with
larger banks or by cancelling their licences. Many of these deregistrations reflected
the final winding-up of banks that had experienced runs in 2002. The Registrar of
Banks argues in his 2003 Annual Report that these were not runs per se, but rather
a residual consolidation, and so are not included in the empirical analysis below.
The period is best characterised as the ‘clean-up’ period. On 21 February, Nedbank
absorbed the banks it had purchased during 2002 and rationalised the number
of bank licences the group held. The affected entities were Nedcor Investment
Bank, Cape of Good Hope Bank and BOE Bank, all of which had already been
operating under the control of Nedbank. In particular, as discussed above, BOE
Bank had been rescued by Nedbank and the deregistration was a formality. The
final three deregistrations were merely closures: ING decided at an international
level to restructure and close, deregistering on 7 July; Rand Merchant Bank
became a division of FirstRand on 28 July and African Merchant Bank closed
on 30 September.
A full timeline of failed banks is provided in Table 2.2. In Table 2.5, I provide
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a more accurate dating technique, which is discussed below.
2.1.2 The research question
In the context of drawing lessons, the primary research question in this chapter is:
why did some banks experience runs and others not? A closely related secondary
research question is: of those banks that failed, why did some experience slower
runs than others? To answer the question, the paper exploits a firm-level data set
of 244,776 observations, made up of detailed balance sheet data for 47 banks over
a 24 month period. The next section discusses the contribution to the existing
literature, followed by the methodology used, data and results.
2.2 Contribution to the literature
Measured by number of bank failures, the 2002/3 crisis is arguably the most
significant banking episode in South African economic history.9 To my knowledge,
there has been no systematic evaluation of the crisis.10
The crisis is notable for the lack of any direct interconnectedness between the
failing banks. There is a large literature arguing that contagion arises because of
interconnectedness (see, for example, Allen and Gale (2000), Haldane and May
(2011), or Acemoglu et al. (2015)) and overlapping exposures (as in Nier et al.
(2007), Gai et al. (2011), Haldane and May (2011) and Glasserman and Young
(2015)). The empirical analysis reveals that the failing banks had relatively low
interbank exposures. They had no direct interconnectedness with Saambou (e.g.
through overlapping claims). An alternative proposed in the literature is that of
‘common exposures’ (Ahnert and Georg, 2018), where runs occur on banks with
similar assets. However, as will be demonstrated, the loan types of the banks that
9The only episode of similar scale is the bank panic of the late 1800s, described in detail by
Arndt (1928). There was a small bank crisis in the mid-1970s, described by Stephen Koseff in
his MBA thesis, Koseff (1984)
10There is some limited discussion of it in Jones (2003), Verhoef (2009) and Gilbert et al.
(2009). Mbuya (2003) usefully summarises press reports charting the rise and fall of Saambou
(albeit with no discussion of the knock-on effects). Van Tonder (2006) considers the event from
a human resources perspective and includes substantial detail on the events before and during
the curatorship.
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failed were no different from those that did not.
A further point of interest is the rich information set, which was available to
depositors ex ante. Monthly data published at bank-level was available, including
on solvency, liquidity, balance sheet structure and other variables. In the absence
of interconnectedness, the theory posits that asymmetric and incomplete informa-
tion can trigger contagion. Information-based runs arise because of information
asymmetries (see Calomiris and Gorton (1991)). This, in turn builds on Diamond
and Dybvig (1983), who argues that depositors with incomplete information run.
Similar findings are made by Sundararajan and Balino (1991). If depositors have
rich information about banks (particularly that they are solvent), then runs should
(theoretically) not take place.
At the time, South Africa was one of only a few G-20 nations that did not
have a system of deposit insurance in place. There are very few modern banking
episodes where deposit insurance is not present in some form (Martin et al., 2017).
In this regard, the episode is not dissimilar to the bank failures in the United
States during the ‘National Banking Period,’ the time between the passage of the
National Banking Acts of 1863/4 and the creation of the United States Federal
Reserve in 1913. There is a rich literature on this period, arguably due to the
number of failures and the observed heterogeneity.11 This literature shows that
bank failures may be due to a number of factors, including common exposures
(an exposure to a particular type of asset class, e.g. property, unsecured loans),
a particular liability structure (e.g. reliance on short-term wholesale funding), or
mismanagement (e.g. pursuing low margin business).
Finally, the episode takes place outside of a sovereign distress, in contrast to
many other banking episodes, particularly in other emerging markets and indeed
some advanced economies (see, for example Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Rein-
hart and Rogoff (2013), Lane (2012) or Provopoulos (2014)).
11See, for example, Friedman and Schwartz (1963), DeLong and Summers (1986), Calomiris
and Gorton (1991),Calomiris and Mason (2003), Calomiris (2008), Gorton (2008), Gorton et al.
(2014) and Jalil (2015)).
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
20 Chapter 2. The South African small bank crisis of 2002/3
2.3 Institutional setting
In the year leading up to the crisis, monetary conditions were relatively loose (see
Figure 2.3). The overnight policy rate (‘repo rate’) had been reduced by 250 bps
from 12 per cent to 9.5 per cent during 2001. On the back of the reduction in the
policy rate, credit extension rose. Credit growth12 averaged 6.9 per cent in 2000
and 8.6 per cent in 2001. The increase was most significant in personal loans, which
expanded 27.4 per cent in 2000 and 26.7 per cent in 2001. Unifer and Saambou
both had substantial exposure to this type of loan.
The reduction in the policy rate was a contributing factor towards a sharp
depreciation in the exchange rate, although not the only reason.13 During the
course of 2001, the rand/dollar exchange rate depreciated significantly, from R7.79
a US dollar in January 2001 to R12.13 a dollar in December, a depreciation of 55.6
per cent.
The number of registered banks increased from 35 in 1994 to 41 by 2000,14 and
the number of foreign-owned banks with local branches rose from 4 to 15.15 The
effect was to create a substantially more competitive banking environment.16
Against the backdrop of relatively loose monetary policy, and financial liberal-
isation, there was a rapid expansion of unsecured loans to vulnerable consumers.
This was a concern to the authorities.17 Lenders were guaranteed that payments
would be honoured as they would be deducted prior to the employee even having his
12Calculated as the monthly average of the year-on-year growth rate.
13A subsequent Commission of Enquiry could not pin-point a specific reason for the
depreciation, but noted a number of contributing factors. These included (i) the reduction
in the central bank policy rate; (ii) large foreign direct investment transactions; and (iii) the
effective tightening of exchange-control requirements, which created a lack of liquidity in the
market.
14Information obtained from the Annual Reports of the Registrar of Banks.
15For a discussion of the financial liberalisation initiatives see Jordaan (1997), Jones (2003),
Verhoef (2009) and Gilbert et al. (2009).
16See also Figure 2.1.
17The rise of microlending was one of the defining features of the post 1994 financial system
(Porteous and Hazelhurst, 2004). In 1992, to support lending, exemptions to the Usury Act were
granted. The effect was to remove the interest rate caps on short-term (less than 36 months)
loans of less than R6 000. Microlending had been envisaged to be a way of supporting financing
of small entrepreneurs. The experience was different – microlending expanded most strongly
as a source of consumer credit. It created increasing distress, and government workers were
particularly badly affected by the practice.
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(a) Shortly before the Saambou failure, the repo rate was increased by 100 bps. During the
midst of the crisis, the repo rate was raised again.
(b) The exchange rate had depreciated rapidly during the course of 2001 reaching an all-time
low by the end of the year.
(c) Credit extension had risen rapidly during the course of 2001.
Figure 2.3: Macroeconomic variables, 2000 – 2003
Overnight policy rate (‘repo rate’), the exchange rate and private sector credit extension growth.
The date of the Saambou failure is indicated by a dashed line.
Source: South African Reserve Bank, monthly data
or her salary paid into their bank account. Arguably the loan was more secure than
a secured loan, because secured loans could only be serviced from the remaining
money. Despite this, they were charging interest rates as if the loan were unsecured.
It was a very profitable, low-risk business.
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Table 2.3: Growth in personal loans, selected periods
Period %
Oct 1995 to Sept 2000 (Automatic deductions stopped) 16.9%
Sept 2000 to Feb 2002 (Saambou failed) 10.7%
Mar 2002 to Dec 2002 0.8%
2.4 Methodology
All South African banks experienced a similar institutional setting, but only some
failed. The first research question is: why did certain banks experience a run and
others not? The second research question is: why did some banks fail immediately,
and others fail later?
To illustrate – out of the ten smallest banks in the sample, only three experi-
enced runs. At the time of the failure, these banks had similar-sized balance sheets,
relatively similar capital adequacy levels and operated in a similar market. BOE,
the largest and most significant bank that failed, was only marginally smaller than
Investec, which was completely unaffected. This was despite Investec holding a
significant indirect share of Saambou. Moreover, BOE had a diversified lending
book and was not particularly exposed to unsecured lending. The deterioration in
the external environment was common to all these banks, but only some appear
to have been affected. A priori, it appears that there is a set of bank-specific
characteristics that caused some banks to experience runs, but others not.
The research questions are approached using a set of techniques, including
simple balance sheet scoring techniques, logistic regression, and survival analysis.
In the appendix, a set of machine learning techniques are also applied. In the
results section, these approaches are compared for predictive power and suitability
for real-time risk monitoring.
I consider each of these in more detail below. A summary of the usefulness of
each approach is given in Table 2.4.
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Table 2.4: Comparison of methodologies
Technique Estimation Advantages Disadvantages
Balance
sheet
scoring
Probability
of a failure
in 24
months
after t
Can be calculated ex
ante Computationally
simple
Easily interpretable
Does not require
accurate failure
dating
Assumes
characteristics are
time-invariant
Logistic
regression
Probability
of a failure
at any time
after t0
Relatively simple to
estimate
Does not require
accurate failure
dating
Marginal effects are
easily interpretable
Estimated ex post
Assumes
characteristics are
time-invariant
Ordered /
multino-
mial
logistic
regression
Probability
of more
than one
outcome
(growing,
surviving
or failing)
Exploits large number
of observations
Marginal effects
difficult to compute
Requires failure
dating
Survival
analysis
Probability
of a failure
at time t
Time to failure Requires accurate
failure dating
Machine
learning
k-NN
Probability
of a failure
Priors about data not
needed
Requires substantial
data
Does not test
regressors
Requires accurate
failure dating
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2.4.1 Balance sheet scoring
Regulators typically undertake balance sheet monitoring on a monthly basis, iden-
tifying the emergence of risks. The volume of data each bank submits to the
regulator is significant, covering multiple aspects of the operations of a bank. A
typical bank is required to submit 65,000 items of income statement, balance sheet
and cash flow information on a monthly basis.18
Given the volume of data, and limited resources, simple balance sheet scoring
methodologies are attractive. Moreover, the large literature and experience of
using them in practical supervisory roles ensures that they are well suited for ex
ante prediction of bank failure. This is in contrast to methodologies that rely on
ex post analysis.
The most widely used technique is ‘CAMELS’, which is an acronym for the six
main components of the regulatory coverage, viz Capital, Asset quality, Manage-
ment, Earnings, Liabilities, and Sensitivity to market risk. The CAMELS regu-
latory approach is a well established and widely-used methodology for assessing
bank risk Bennett et al. (2015), Hwa et al. (2017), Kupiec et al. (2017), and has
proven to be robust and reasonably comprehensive approach for evaluating bank
risk. It is particularly appropriate for smaller banks, and forms the basis of the
United States Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) approach to bank
supervision (FDIC, 2018).
2.4.2 Logistic regression
Balance sheet scoring methodologies rely on an ex ante view of the relative im-
portance of different factors in determining the probability of failure. A bank
with weak liquidity, but otherwise strong scores in other areas, may still fail.
Regression techniques provide an ex post approach to determining which factors
have historically led to bank failures.
For the first set of analyses, I estimate the probability that a bank would expe-
rience a run, based on its own underlying characteristics using a simple regression
18Estimated by using the number of data points required by the Regulations for Banks issued
by the Minister of Finance.
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of the form:
P (runi,j|runS,j−1) = β0 + β1Xi,j (2.1)
where P (runi|runS) is the probability of a run on bank i at time j, conditional
on a run having been experienced by the initial node (in this case Saambou) in the
prior period, expressed as a function of a constant β0 and a set of variables Xi at
time j. The set of bank specific variables included in Xi are the share of liabilities
from financial institutions, a measure of liability growth, deposit growth, share
of short-term liabilities, share of assets in financial instruments, capital adequacy
ratio, and a measure of non-performing loans.
Logistic regression is well suited for this analysis, and is widely used in the
literature. The dependent variable is binary (whether or not a run has occurred)
and the independent variables are a set of characteristics of the banks in the sample.
It is possible to estimate the marginal effect of a change in an independent variable
on the probability of a run occurring.19 The model is estimated using maximum
likelihood methods, and in R, the function used is glm.
Marginal effects
In a linear regression, the parameter estimates are partial derivatives, dy/dx, or
‘marginal effects,’ i.e. they provide an estimate of the change in the dependent
variable from a change in the independent variable. As logistic regressions are non-
linear, the parameter estimates from cannot be interpreted in this way. To sensibly
interpret the estimated coefficients, the marginal effects need to be calculated.
For continuous variables, the marginal effects measure the instantaneous rate of
change, i.e. the impact of a very small change on the dependent variable. The
calculation provides a good approximation of the partial effect of impact of changes.
The marginal effects are not constant – the impact on the dependent variable will
be different at different values of the independent variable.
In the results section below, both the odds ratio and the marginal effects are
reported.
19A discussion of the approach is provided in Johnston and DiNardo (1997).
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2.4.3 Survival models
A logistic regression provides a statistical technique to predict that a failure will
occur, but does not predict when the failure will occur. There may be reason to
believe that a set of independent variables may slow a failure (for example, high
levels of capital) or speed it up (for example, a liquidity squeeze).
Cox (1972) proposes a regression technique originally developed for use in med-
ical research. It estimates the relationship between the survival time of patients
and the underlying characteristics of those patients. The approach has also been
extensively used for modelling other event studies with time as a factor. Examples
of studies with bankruptcy include Shumway (2001), and for bank failures by Lane
et al. (1986), Iyer et al. (2012), Cox et al. (2017), and Martin et al. (2017).
The Cox model specifies a ‘hazard function’, which introduces time as an
element. The hazard λi(t) for individual i at time t is given as:
λi(t) = λ0(t)e
Xi(t)β (2.2)
where λ0 is the ‘baseline hazard’, and β is a vector of coefficents. The equation
thus gives the effect on the baseline hazard of a set of coefficients multiplied by a
set of variables. To interpret the hazard, one can calculate a ‘hazard ratio’, which
gives the effect of a particular variable on the survival time. Assume, the hazard
ratio with two subjects and fixed covariate vectors Xi and Xj, then
λi(t)
λj(t)
=
λ0(t)e
Xiβ
λ0(t)eXjβ
=
eXiβ
eXjβ
(2.3)
This hazard ratio is constant over time, i.e. the hazard ratio is proportional,
hence ‘proportional hazard model.’
I use the coxph function in the survival package available in R to implement
the Cox proportional hazards approach outlined above. The package calculates the
hazard function and the set of β coefficients. The hazard ratio can be interpreted
as follows. Where the HR = 1, there is no effect, i.e. a unit change in the
independent variable has a unit impact on the outcome; Where the HR < 1,
then a change in that factor causes the likelihood of failure to decrease; while if
HR > 1, then that factor causes the likelihood of failure to increase.
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2.4.4 Random forest
The use of machine learning techiques for economic applications has expanded
rapidly (Athey, 2017). Decision trees are simple and practical approaches to
classifying data, and are a popular classification approach in machine learning en-
vironments (Varian, 2014). These techniques have no theoretical underpinning and
so provide an atheoretical approach to testing data hypotheses. Most significantly,
machine learning techiques provide substantial opportunities for ‘big data’ (Varian,
2014), being well-suited for trawling large data sets looking for relationships. It is
also well suited for algorithmic data analysis – fitting relationships in a structured
way. For these reasons, the techniques are valuable during the data exploration
phase of the question.
Here, I apply one type of methodology, the random forest decision tree. De-
cisions trees may provide good predictions because of the use of a large number
of explanatory variables (much as a large number of regressors will lead to a high
unadjusted R2). Varian (2014) notes the need to ‘prune’ the tree, which is simply a
means of creating a cost for complexity (almost in the same way that the adjusted
R2 works).
The random forest model sequentially discriminates data into different cate-
gories. It is particularly useful for microeconomic questions, providing high out-of-
sample fits, and is notably appropriate for highly non-linear data (Varian, 2014).
A drawback is that it lacks simple summaries of relationships.
The performance of simple decision trees can be enhanced by expanding the
‘tree’ to a ‘forest’, that is, by using multiple trees Varian (2014). The multiple
trees are created using bootstrap aggregating of random samples of observations.
At each node (decision point, or ‘leaf’), a random sample of predictors is chosen.
This process is repeated multiple times. The final classification is determined by
using a ‘majority vote’, that is by identifying which tree performed best on an
aggregated basis.
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2.5 Data
The data set contains monthly data on 217 individual balance sheet items for the
full sample of 47 banks which had banking licences at the time of the Saambou
curatorship, and for which there is sufficient data. A data set is collected from
January 2001 to December 2002, giving information on the 13 months prior to the
failure and 11 months after. There are 244,776 data points.
The data set is constructed from publicly-available detailed balance sheet data
from the Banking Supervision Department of the South African Reserve Bank.20
2.5.1 Data pre-processing
From this information, a number of financial ratios and balance sheet items are
constructed. These include summary balance sheet items.
There are data for 29 different asset types. These are aggregated into high-
level categories, viz: (i) Inter-bank assets; (ii) Resale and installment loans; (iii)
Mortgages; (iv) Credit card loans; (v) Loans to companies (non-financial and
financial); (vi) Other loans (mainly personal loans to individuals); (vii) Other
investments and assets (mainly investments in financial intruments; and (viii)
specific provisions.
There is information on twenty liability categories. These are aggregated and
summarised into nine main categories: (i) Intergroup; (ii) Interbank; (iii) Public
liabilities; (iv) Financial; (v) Non-financial; (vi) Individuals; (vii) Non-profits;
(viii) Non-residents; and (ix) Other.
For each liability, tenor is also available in three buckets: short term, medium
term and long term. This allows a further set of ratios to be constructed for
duration.
This is complemented with historical performance data, including historic lia-
bility growth, retail deposit growth, and retail lending growth. Additional infor-
mation, including estimates of market share (by product line), are also calculated
from the date.
20Although confidential bank specific information provided by each bank was considered, for
replicability and confidentiality reasons, this data was not included.
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Finally, there is high-level information available on capital. From this infor-
mation, a number of ratios are calculated. Following Estrella et al. (2002), four
capital adequacy ratios were calculated. The first was a simple equity-to-liabilities.
The second was the equity-to-unweighted assets ratio. The third was to follow the
Basel approach and calculate a equity-to-risk weighted assets ratio. Finally, a
‘solvency ratio’ was calculated, with this ratio is defined as asset minus liabilities
as a percentage of assets.
The data set is summarised in Appendix B.
2.5.2 Date of failure
For estimation purposes, it is important to define a ‘bank failure’ and date it.
There are two possible approaches. In the first approach, ‘failed banks’ can be
designated as those that are either placed into curatorship or lose their licences
(either voluntarily or because their financial positions have deteriorated signifi-
cantly). The disadvantage of this approach is that the date of the failure may be
too late – typically a licence is only withdrawn at the end of a depositor run. A
second disadvantage is that it excludes banks which are rescued. Indeed, during
the banking episode, BoE remained technically intact. The run took place in
March 2002, but the licence was only withdrawn in early 2003 when the merger
with Nedbank was finalised.
In the second approach, failed banks could be determined statistically – for
example, banks that experience a run of more than 50 per cent of their deposits
over the two-year period are deemed to have ‘failed.’ This approach side-steps
some of the disadvantages above, but has its own disadvantages. Firstly, it is
difficult to date the ‘failure.’ Is it at the end of the run, during the run, or when
the run begins? For the banks in the ‘second wave,’ there is evidence of a slow run.
Even banks in the ‘first wave’ had seen a slow run prior to Saambou curatorship.
Secondly, the threshold of 50 per cent is arbitrary. Some banks lost their licences
after a run of 20 per cent of their liabilities. Other banks lost all deposits. One
international bank saw a plunge in its deposit base during the course of the episode,
and managed to restore confidence to the extent that deposits returned.
For these reasons, for the purposes of this chapter, I follow a hybrid of the two
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approaches, supplemented with publically-available information. I review each of
the 47 banks in the sample, and match their licence information to the behaviour
of their liabilities. Only failures in the 12 months following the Saambou failure
are considered (the first and second waves), on the basis that it is the short-term
contagion we are interested in. Moreover, evidence is sought that failed banks
saw large outflows from the date of the Saambou event, i.e. experienced sustained
runs. The dates are provided in Table 2.5.
Table 2.5: Dating of failures
Bank Estimated failure Cancellation / curatorship
International Bank 30-Sep-01 30-Apr-02
Corpcapital 31-Oct-01 29-Nov-02
TA Bank of SA 31-Dec-01 05-Apr-02
Saambou 15-Jan-02 09-Feb-02
Brait 31-Jan-02 30-Sep-02
PSG Investment 31-Jan-02 31-Oct-02
BOE Bank 31-Jan-02 21-Feb-03
Cadiz 15-Apr-02 15-Apr-02
FirstCorp 17-Apr-02 17-Apr-02
Old Mutual Bank 31-Aug-02 17-Dec-02
Merrill Lynch 15-Sep-02 05-Apr-02
Securities Investment 30-Sep-02 18-Feb-03
This table estimates the date that runs began on the twelve affected banks.
See text for an explanation of the methodology.
This provides us with a set of 12 banks which ‘fail,’ and 35 banks which
‘survive.’ As noted above, in total 22 banks left the system, i.e. 10 additional banks
deregistered as part of the consolidation. However, using the methodology here,
these are not captured as failures – they are part of a third wave of consolidation
which is considered separately in a later section.
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2.6 Results
2.6.1 Did size and interconnectedness matter?
The extensive data set allows for some preliminary analysis. One hypothesis is
that only small banks failed, i.e. that this was a true ‘small bank crisis,’ which
led to the failure of all small banks. From the data analysis, the answer to this
appears more nuanced. The four large banks, defined as those with market share
of more than 12.5 per cent, did indeed survive. However, out of the two mid-tier
banks (banks with a market share of between 2.5 per cent and 12.5 per cent), one
failed (BOE) and one survived (Investec). As seen in Figure 2.4, of the group of
41 small banks (those with a market share of less than 2.5 per cent), 11 failed and
30 survived.
A second simple hypothesis is that the banks were highly connected. The data
allows some testing of interconnectedness between banks, and how this intercon-
nectedness changed during the course of the crisis. The authorities intervened with
BOE to stabilise its liquidity situation, and this was reflected in a sharp increase
in interbank liabilities. For this reason, I exclude BOE from the analysis and focus
on the banks that failed.21 It is notable from Figure 2.5 that there is little evidence
that interconnected banks were more likely to fail.
2.6.2 CAMELS analysis
In terms of a CAMELS analysis, three of the components in the CAMELS analysis
put forward in Figure 2.6 are notable: capital, liquidity and market risk.
Banks that failed had substantially more capital than those that survived
(Panel 1 in Figure 2.6). Moreover, they had better solvency ratios, defined as
the difference between assets and liabilities as a percentage of assets (Panel 2).
As the failing banks were better capitalised and more solvent than surviving
banks, solvency clearly was not the concern. This is a consistent finding across all
methodologies.
21This only provides aggregate interbank exposures. We also analyse the financial statements
of both Saambou and the affected banks, and there is no evidence that there were any interbank
linkages between Saambou and the banks that failed.
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(a) All very large banks survived (those with a
market share of over 12.5% of the system).
However, amongst the small banks, failures
appear equally distributed.
(b) Box-plots confirm that the size of surviving
and failing banks was on average the same.
ANOVA tests confirm that small banks were
not more likely to fail.
Figure 2.4: Did the size of the bank matter?
Failing banks also had shorter-term, wholesale funding (Panels 7 and 8). The
types of liabilities differed significantly: failures had a higher proportion of short-
term liabilities and a higher proportion of wholesale liabilities. This suggests that
it was not a ‘retail deposit’ run, but rather a run by short-term wholesale funders.
This is borne out by Panel 10, where it is notable that the failing banks had a
smaller proportion of funding from retail depositors than surviving banks. While
the Saambou run was due to relatively sophisticated retail depositors, it is clear
that the run on other banks was due to a wholesale run. South Africa did not have
a deposit insurance scheme at the time of the failure. As it was not a depositor
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Figure 2.5: Box-and-whisker plots, interconnectedness.
I test the hypothesis that more interconnected banks were more likely to fail following the
Saambou failure. There is no evidence with banks with large exposures to other banks were
more likely to experience runs. ANOVA tests confirm these results. BOE is excluded as it had
a large interbank position due to the liquidity guarantee.
run, deposit insurance would not have staunched the outflow.22
The third difference between surviving and failing banks is sensitivity to market
risk. This is measured by considering the percentage of the balance sheet invested
in financial instruments (defined as investments including trading portfolio assets).
Failing banks had a notably higher exposure to these trading assets, suggesting
they were particularly affected by movements in share prices, possibly as part of
the fall in bank share prices that occurred over the period between Unibank and
BOE failing.
The analysis also shows that the failing and surviving banks did not differ
substantially in terms of asset quality and earnings (Figure 2.6 presents three
types). Non-performing loans as a percentage of total loans and advances were
not different between surviving and failing banks. Neither the return on assets nor
the types of assets differed – both surviving and failing banks have approximately
22The traditional argument for deposit insurance (see Diamond and Dybvig (1983)) is that
it avoids a panic depositor run, as bank deposits are safe. In this case, the deposit insurance
scheme would have had to apply to non-retail deposits too. Deposit insurance schemes can
protect themselves from moral hazard through risk-based premia.
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similar exposures to unsecured assets and to mortgages.
2.6.3 Why did some banks fail? Logistic regression results
The preliminary indication from the CAMELS analysis is that that certain banks
failed because they were more fragile than others – that is, they had weak balance
sheets.
A review of the literature and the CAMELS analysis provide a set of potential
variables which could increase the probability of a bank failure. The preliminary
CAMELS analysis presented in 2.6 highlights that failing banks had higher levels of
capital, higher levels of short-term and wholesale funding, and were more exposed
to financial instruments.
The results of a set of logistic regressions, presented in Table 2.6, bear out
this initial evidence, and highlight that balance sheet structure influenced the
probability of failure. I test a variety of specifications, to ensure robustness of
results.
Across all specifications, increased wholesale funding and short-term funding
are associated with an increased probability of failure. This is consistent with a
view that increased short-term wholesale funding increases bank funding risk, a
finding also demonstrated by Huang and Ratnovski (2011) and De Bruyckere et al.
(2013) amongst others.
There is a persistently statistically significant coefficient on deposit growth,
but the sign is negative. I test for different specifications. In specification 1, I test
for the total growth of liabilties in the year prior to the failure. The coefficient is
-0.042, with a standard error of 0.017. In an alternative specification, presented
as specification 2 of Table 2.6, I use the growth in deposits only (i.e. excluding
non-deposit liabilities). In this specification, the coefficient of interest is smaller,
but still negative (-0.018, with a standard error of 0.009).
In light of the negative coefficient, the initial evidence in Figure 2.2 is recon-
sidered. It is notable that on aggregate, the banks that experienced runs in 2002
had already started seeing outflows. This suggests that for whatever reason, there
were already indications from depositors about concerns with these banks. This
does highlight that these banks may already have been perceived to be weak, and
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Figure 2.6: CAMELS analysis
Surviving and failing banks are compared using the CAMELS methodology. I find a statistical
difference between failing and surviving banks in the following areas: (i) Capital, with failing
banks having higher levels of capital, (ii) Liabilities, with failing banks having higher levels of
short-term and wholesale funding; and (iii) Sensitivity to market risk, with failing banks being
more exposed to financial instruments.
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that the Saambou curatorship (and the Unifer/Unibank announcement) confirmed
suspicions about small banks with large exposure to personal loans.
Specification (4) adds the role of exposure to financial instruments. Banks
with large exposures to financial instruments are found to be more likely to fail.
A number of different types of asset exposures were considered, but only ‘Other
Assets’ was found to to be statistically significant (‘Other assets’ measures the
extent of investments in financial instruments, financial assets and derivatives.
It provides a market risk measure). A simple ‘sanity check’ – analysing the
distribution of assets between failed banks and non-failed banks shows that there
is no evidence of common exposures, i.e. the banks did not have similar loan
portfolios.
Specification (5) tests the role of capital. A number of measures are used,
and the role of simple unweighted assets to liabilities is reported. It is statis-
tically significant and positive, in line with the results obtained in Figure 2.6.
Interestingly, it appears that the coefficient on financial instruments is no longer
statistically positive. However, other measures of capital (not reported here) show
that financial instruments remain statistically significant. For example, when using
the equity-to-debt ratio as a measure of capital, the share of financial instruments
is still significant.
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Predictive power
The predictive power of the model is presented in in three ways. First, the
predicted probabilities for the year prior to the Saambou curatorship are presented
in Figure 2.7. I present the average predicted probability for all banks and for the
group of failed banks. It is notable that banks were weak ex ante. The Saambou
failure appears to have triggered the failure of banks that were already weak due
to fragile balance sheets (particularly an over reliance on short-term wholesale
funding).
Figure 2.7: Probability of failure
The figure presents the probability of failure for failed banks and all banks. The date of the
Saambou curatorship is indicated with a dashed line.
The second way to test for how accurate the model is to compare actual versus
predicted failures. Four of the specifications in Table 2.6 are tested: specification 1,
2, 4 and 5. I exclude specification 3 as that included Saambou; and specification 6
as other statistical tests suggest the parameters are not significant. The predictive
power of the model is presented in Table 2.7. Specification 5 emerges as the best
from a fit perspective. 33 banks are classified correctly as ‘Survive.’ Two surviving
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banks are classified as ‘Fail.’ Two banks that failed are predicted to survive, but
8 failed banks are correctly predicted to fail.23
Marginal effects
As discussed in section 2.4.2, the coefficients from logit models are not immediately
interpretable, in contrast to the coefficients from linear regression. Marginal effects
need to be calculated to obtain an estimate of the impact of a unit change in the
dependent variable on the probability of the event.
I present the marginal effects in three ways. The first panel of Figure 2.9
presents the average marginal effect. Though marginal effects are non-linear an
average effect can nevertheless be estimated by considering a unit change at mean
of the dependent variable. Figure 2.8 presents the joint marginal effects, i.e. a
simultaneous increase in both the percentage of financial liabilities and short-term
liabilities.
Panels b and d in Figure 2.9 present the conditional expected values of the
probability of failure given a set of different values for financial liabilities, as a
proportion of total liabilities and as a ratio of short-term liabilities to long-term
liabilities, respectively. Both these plots show the strong positive relationship
between the probability of failure.
23Recall that twelve banks failed. The model only contains ten banks as Saambou is excluded,
and Cadiz bank did not have sufficient data for the analysis.
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Table 2.7: Goodness of fit estimates: logistic regression
Eq. 1 Eq. 4
P(Survive) P(Fail) P(Survive) P(Fail)
Survive 33 2 35 Survive 33 2 35
Fail 4 6 10 Fail 3 7 10
37 8 36 9
Eq. 2 Eq. 5
P(Survive) P(Fail) P(Survive) P(Fail)
Survive 32 3 35 Survive 33 2 35
Fail 6 4 10 Fail 2 8 10
38 7 35 10
Goodness of fit statistics (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
McFaddenR2 0.47 0.31 0.32 0.54 0.60 0.65
R2 ML 0.39 0.28 0.29 0.44 0.47 0.50
R2 CU 0.60 0.43 0.44 0.67 0.72 0.76
Hosmer-Lemeshow C stat (p-value) 0.39 0.85 0.13 0.62 0.54 0.62
Hosmer-Lemeshow H stat (p-value) 0.29 0.29 0.76 0.85 0.74 0.85
Note:
This table presents a simple goodness of fit measure (‘confusion matrix’) for the logistic
regressions in Table 2.6. The upper panel presents the number of predicted fails against
the actual fails. This allows for the identification of Type 1 errors (false positive) and
Type 2 errors (false negatives). The lower panel presents different pseudo-R2 statistics
for logistic regressions. Cadiz Bank was dropped due to data quality.
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Figure 2.8: Joint marginal effects
The probability of failure shown as a result of the joint effects of an increase in both financial
and short-term liabilities as a percentage of total. The model predicts that banks with high
percentages of short-term and financial liabilities were very likely to fail.
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(b) The probability of a run is an increasing
function of the proportion of financial
liabilities. Here we present the probability of
failure as the conditional expected value given
a locus of financial liabilities as a percentage of
total liabilities. The conditional expected value
is derived from the marginal effects model.
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(c) The probability of a run is inversely related
to deposit growth in the year prior to the
Saambou failure.
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(d) The probability of a run is an increasing
function of the ratio of short-term liabilities to
long-term liabilities.
Figure 2.9: Marginal effects
2.6.4 Why did some banks fail later than others?
The Cox proportional hazard model, detailed in the methodology section, incor-
porates the time to failure, and the results are presented in Table 2.8.
In specification (1), I test the impact of increased wholesale funding, deposit
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growth, short-term funding, other assets and non-performing loans on the proba-
bility of failure at time t. It is immediately apparent that the same variables are
statistically significant for both the logistic and Cox survivor methodologies. In
particular, wholesale funding is significant and positive, indicating the probability
of failure is increased (or probability of survival reduced).
Historical deposit growth is similarly statistically significant and negative,
underscoring the finding that banks that were already experiencing outflows were
more likely to fail, and that the failure of Saambou may only have accelerated the
run, rather than precipitated it. Moreover, exposure to financial instruments is also
statistically significant and positive, similarly to the logistic regression findings.
Although wholesale funding is statistically significant for the Cox regression
results, short-term funding is not. The Cox regressions highlight that the structure
of funding appears to create the difference in the time-to-failure. Both first and
second wave banks were at risk of failure, with evidence that weak banks failed
sooner if they had short-term funding. This is consistent with evidence from other
countries; banks with short-term liabilties are more fragile when faced with an
exogenous shock (Huang and Ratnovski, 2011).
The most notable difference between the logistic regression results and the Cox
results is the role of non-performing loans. The Cox results show an increased
likelihood of failure for banks with higher non-performing loans. I test for any
correlation between non-performing loans and other variables, in case there is
multicollinearity. In particular, the correlation is low between unweighted cap-
ital adequacy and non-performing loans (0.134), between exposure to financial
instruments and non-performing loans (-.043), and between exposure to financial
instruments and unweighted equity (0.191).
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Table 2.8: How did time influence failure? Cox survivor analysis results
Dependent variable:
Days_to_run2
(1) (2) (3)
Fin. sector liab (share) 0.097∗∗ 0.052∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.024) (0.039)
Deposit growth −0.017∗ −0.017∗
(0.010) (0.010)
ST liabilities (share) 0.022
(0.018)
Other assets (share) 0.062∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.018) (0.027)
Equity to Liabilites 0.066∗∗ 0.039∗∗ 0.058∗∗
(0.027) (0.019) (0.024)
NPL ratio 0.140∗ 0.118∗∗ 0.153∗∗
(0.072) (0.053) (0.072)
Observations 45 46 45
R2 0.453 0.294 0.431
Max. Possible R2 0.807 0.830 0.807
Log Likelihood −23.416 −32.819 −24.302
Wald Test 11.140∗ (df = 6) 11.630∗∗ (df = 4) 9.990∗ (df = 5)
LR Test 27.144∗∗∗ (df = 6) 15.995∗∗∗ (df = 4) 25.371∗∗∗ (df = 5)
Score (Logrank) Test 23.301∗∗∗ (df = 6) 16.916∗∗∗ (df = 4) 21.902∗∗∗ (df = 5)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
This table presents the results of Cox survivor analysis. The independent variable, time to
failure, is calculated according to a hybrid approach discussed in the text. The dependent
variables take their values at the point that Saambou went into curatorship. Cadiz Bank is
dropped due to poor data quality.
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Interpreting the results
Cox survivor analysis can be interpreted through survivor curves. These graph-
ically present how estimated survival depends upon the value of a covariate of
interest. Survivor curves plot the probability of survival of the mean bank, i.e. a
bank with characteristics at the mean. A plot of the survival of a hypothetical
alternate bank, with different characteristics can then be compared to that of the
mean bank. Figure 2.10 shows the survival probability for a bank with increased
wholesale funding and increased non-performing loans. The dramatic deterioration
in survival probability is evident.
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Figure 2.10: Survival plots
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2.6.5 Machine learning: Random forest
The ‘decision to run’ can also be considered in terms of a decision tree. Figure 2.11
presents the decision tree graphically. A decision of 1 is a bank failure. At the first
decision node, the question is ‘Is short-term duration less than 100?’ If no, then
the right-hand branch is followed. Here, the algorithm shifts to the next decision
node. The next question is ‘Is the solvency ratio larger than or equal to 0.81?’ If
yes, then the left-hand node is followed, and the answer is 0, i.e. no failure. If no,
then the right-hand branch is followed, and the answer is 1, i.e. a failure.
This may be interpreted as saying that banks short term funding ratio of 100
per cent will fail if their solvency ratios are less than 81 per cent. If yes, then
further questions are asked about the asset quality of the bank, with final decisions
of either ‘fail’ or ‘survive.’
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Figure 2.11: Decision tree
The random forest approach has the advantage of ordering variables in terms
of importance, similar in some ways to principal components analysis. In Figure
2.12, I generate a variable importance plot from the random forest model above.
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Figure 2.12: Variable importance plot
This presents the variables used in the random forest model in order of relative importance to the
decision. Two tests are used – Mean Decrease Accuracy and Mean Decrease Gini. The former
measures the impact of excluding a variable on the accuracy of the model. The latter is a related
measure that technically measures the impact of the variable on the homogeneity of the nodes
and leaves. The most important variable is short-term liabilities.
It shows a somewhat different outcome from the analysis using traditional
econometric techniques. The percentage of short-term funding is still the dominant
driver of the results. However, the proportion of ‘Other Assets’ is the second
most important determinant of failure. (Recall that ‘Other Assets’ are financial
instruments. Banks with these assets are more typically investment banks). In
the CAMELS analysis, this was also noted (see Panel 10 of Figure 2.6, and the
discussion in section 2.6.2). In the logistic regression, specification 4, this variable
was statistically significant, but only at the 10 per cent level. Moreover, the odds
ratio was smaller than the financial sector liabilities odds ratio.
This shows the power of alternative machine-learning techniques to bring out
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data features not necessarily captured by traditional econometrics, a point also
made by Varian (2014).
2.6.6 Can these results predict other failures?
The results in this study are particular to the 2002/3 period. The model performed
relatively well at predicting in-sample failures (recall Figure 2.7 and Table 2.7).
However, it is a worthwhile experiment to see if the results can accurately predict
others bank failures, particularly the 2014 failure of African Bank (discussed in
Chapter 4) and the 2018 failure of VBS Mutual Bank.
Data points from African Bank and VBS Mutual Bank are placed into the
specification 4 of the logistic regressions reported above. I use the data from their
balance sheet in the year prior to failure to generate the predicted probability of
failure. In the case of African Bank, it is a years’ worth of data starting in August
2013; and in VBS Mutual Bank, a year of data from February 2017. The results
are plotted in Figure 2.13. It shows that the model is quite accurate at predicting
even completely out of sample failures (both failures were characterised by banks
with high levels of wholesale and short-term funding, which deteriorated as the
failure neared).
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Figure 2.13: Predicted failure probabilities
The balance sheet data for African Bank (Panel a) and VBS Mutual Bank (Panel b) for the
twelve months ahead of the failure is placed into the model.
2.6.7 Long-run effect of the Saambou collapse
The consolidation substantially increased concentration in the banking system.
Before the crisis, BOE had a market share of 13.1 per cent of the mortgage market,
and Saambou had a 3.3 per cent share. The crisis reduced the competitiveness
of the mortgage market. Reviewing the data highlights another feature of the
episode. In a closed system (i.e. a system with a sovereign currency and currency
convertibility rules such as South Africa), liquidity cannot move outside of the
system. This is partially due to currency convertibility rules. Only Authorised
Dealers (ADs) can convert rand into other currencies. These ADs must, in turn,
be registered South African banks. The effect is that rand liquidity circulates
between ADs. This is quite different from a run on Greek banks, for example.
Any bank in the euro area can accept Euros. Thus the liquidity of the euro can
move from Greece to Germany. Conversely, in a closed system, a run on one bank
must reflect as an inflow into another, or alternatively as an increase in notes and
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coins.24
Figure 2.14: Market share: Before and after consolidation
Market share of ‘other banks’ fell from 22 per cent to 12 per cent. BOE was wholly subsumed
into Nedbank, and Saambou was split between FNB (Homeloans) and African Bank (personal
loans).
The experience in South Africa was indeed that liability holders reallocated
their deposits and there was a a discernible ‘flight to quality’. Simply put, a set of
banks experienced substantial inflows. While more than four banks experienced
inflows, the majority of flows went to four. These banks are now known as the
‘Big Four’ because of their dominance, but prior to the episode they were not as
24The increase in notes and coins is a feature of episodes in other countries, particularly in
the National Bank Period and failures in less-developed countries.
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significant. In January 2002, prior to the curatorship, these four accounted for 62.4
per cent of assets. By January 2003, they accounted for 88.4 per cent of assets.
The most notable ‘winner’ from the episode was Nedbank, which saw its market
share rise from 14.0 per cent to 22.3 per cent, almost entirely due to its purchase of
BOE. Figure 2.14 shows the change in market share during this time. The market
share shift is most notable at product level, with the crisis leaving a substantial
concentration in home loans.
The second ‘winner’ was African Bank, which was at the time a small unsecured
lending business. It purchased the Saambou unsecured lending book at a discount,
and this formed the basis of its growth strategy over the next few years.
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Figure 2.15: Fee income
There was an approximately 5 percentage point increase in the ratio of fee income to interest
income, suggesting substantial pricing power after the crisis.
Source: Reserve Bank Banking Supervision Department.
The resultant concentration of the system may have had the inadvertent effect
of increasing bank profitability and market power. Some of the literature (Allen
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and Gale, 2004; Sinclair and Farrell, 2017) has argued that there is an inherent com-
petition stability trade-off. That is that banks in more concentrated, oligopolistic
systems may be ‘safer’ because the incentives to take on risk are reduced. In Figure
2.15, this comes to the fore. Between 2001 and 2003, the ratio of fee income to
interest income was 20 per cent. However, following the consolidation, the ratio
was just over 25 per cent. This suggests that the consolidation led to pricing power
which manifest in higher fees being charged.
2.7 The authorities’ response
The curatorship was announced on Monday, 4 February 2002. The pressures
on BOE and the other banks began immediately. A further statement made on
Thursday, 14 February outlined some of the rationale for the decision (Minister of
Finance, 2002). It noted that:
In examining options, we firmly held the view that to commit Govern-
ment financial assistance to SAAMBOU Bank would not be prudent as
there was no guarantee that those funds would either restore confidence
or not be utilised to fund further large net outflows from depositors
funds out of the bank.
This statement did not restore confidence to the banking system – quite the
opposite as the perception emerged that the authorities would not provide any
support to small banks. The situation at BOE deteriorated and all its assets were
fully guaranteed, albeit a full month later on 14 March 2002.
This echoes the inappropriate response by the US Federal Reserve as the Great
Depression unfolded, and it is worth repeating this paragraph from Friedman
(1968):
[Money supply] fell not because there were no willing borrowers – not
because the horse would not drink. It fell because the Federal Reserve
System forced or permitted a sharp reduction in the monetary base,
because it failed to exercise the responsibilities assigned to it in the
Federal Reserve Act to provide liquidity to the banking system.
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Figure 2.16 demonstrates that the authorities did not intervene heavily in the
market to provide liquidity or ease monetary conditions. Indeed, the repo rate
was raised by 400 bps, from 9.5 per cent in December 2001 to 13.5 per cent in
September 2002, as the Reserve Bank aimed to dampen the second-round effects
of the sharp depreciation in the rand experienced during late 2001.
(a) Imputed interest rates rose over the course of the crisis, mainly due to
repo rate increases. In total the repo rate was raised by 400 bps, from 9.5
per cent in December 2001 to 13.5 per cent in September 2002. Also see
Figure 2.3.
(b) Some additional liquidity was provided to the system, with a small peak
in June 2002. However, this liquidity was not widely provided.
(c) Credit growth slowed significantly during the course of the crisis.
Figure 2.16: Policy response
The central bank did not intervene significantly to provide liquidity or support to the banking
sector
Source: South African Reserve Bank, monthly data
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Institutionally, the way in which the Reserve Bank considered the 2002/3 crisis
is borne out by its own subsequent analysis. There is extensive analysis of the
crisis in the Bank Supervision Annual Report. However, it is not mentioned in
the Monetary Policy Review, nor in the minutes of the monetary policy committee
issued on 14 March 2002, in the middle of the crisis. For monetary policy purposes,
the authorities appear to have judged that the contraction in credit growth was
not due to the crisis. This is despite evidence that the effective interest rate rose
and the net interest margin rose, suggesting tighter monetary policy conditions.
The credit contraction was in corporate lending, and many of the banks that failed
were corporate lenders. Indeed, at its 14 March 2002 meeting, the monetary policy
committee raised interest rates by 100 bps. There is, however, a long discussion
of the crisis in the 2002 Banking Supervision Annual Report (Registrar of Banks,
2002), produced by a different department in the Reserve Bank. In contrast,
the supervision annual report does not discuss credit trends, but rather discusses
growth in bank assets. It also notes that some banks received liquidity support,
but does not disclose which. In the monthly banking statistics, none of the banks
disclose receiving liquidity.
There was substantial engagement between the then Minister, Trevor Manuel
and the Reserve Bank about the appropriate course of action. In her biography
of Manuel, Green (2012, 506) outlines the disagreement between the Treasury
and Reserve Bank. She notes the discovery of a letter from the financial director
of Saambou, addressed to the auditors of the bank and to Christo Wiese, the
Registrar of Banks. On the basis of the letter, the Treasury concluded that
Saambou was insolvent and that liquidity provision would not be an appropriate
course of action. The Registrar subsequently indicated that he thought this was the
incorrect decision, and that the decision may have led to the run. His summary
of the Saambou failure in the Bank Supervision Department’s Annual Report
(Registrar of Banks, 2002) was also read to imply that he disagreed with the
decision, and interviews he gave to the press underlined his view. This evidently
led to him being asked to take early retirement – see Mittner (2003b).
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2.8 Conclusion
The 2002/3 banking crisis presents an opportunity to better understand bank
failures, and draw lessons for the system of financial regulation. The failure was
unique internationally – at the time there was little interconnectedness between
the banks, South Africa did not have deposit insurance, and there was extensive
ex ante information available to depositors.
The chapter argues that the response of the authorities was inappropriate,
and highlighted some coordination weaknesses (between and within institutions).
In the year leading up to the small bank crisis, unsecured lending grew by 26.7
per cent, and overall credit growth averaged 9.5 per cent. The central bank,
however, reduced the benchmark policy rate. Moreover, the exchange rate depre-
ciated significantly. When the first bank failed in February 2002, the authorities
intervened only tentatively – providing a deposit guarantee to one of the large
banks. Contagion quickly spread, and faced with a generalised loss of confidence
amongst a group of small banks, the authorities did not provide unlimited liquidity
support.
The response was within the framework of the ‘Greenspan Standard’. In the
year leading up to the failure, the central bank did not intervene to slow credit
growth, preferring a ‘clean, not lean’. But when the crisis hit, the Reserve Bank
progressively increased the overnight policy rate during the course of the crisis,
creating potentially greater liquidity pressures. The episode shows the need for
a coordinating framework for different functions of the central bank (liquidity
provision, monetary policy formulation and banking supervision).
In the next chapter, I outline the approach taken over the years leading into
the global financial crisis. Lessons from the small bank crisis appear to have been
learnt, and the response was substantially more sophisticated.
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Chapter 3
Why did South Africa not
experience a banking crisis in 2008?
In contrast to many other jurisdictions, South Africa did not experience a banking
failure during the 2008 global financial crisis. In the years prior to the crisis, the
banking supervisor increased capital adequacy ratios, due to concerns about rapid
growth in credit extension and rising asset prices. I extend the government’s main
forecasting and policy model to show that this dampened credit and the financial
cycle, and reduced the risk of a financial crisis. The chapter shows the importance
of a monetary and macroprudential policy decision making framework.
3.1 Introduction
South Africa did not experience a significant bank failure during the global financial
crisis period. A number of explanations have been proposed for this, including a
budget surplus leading into the crisis, a credible monetary policy framework, and
a sound bank regulatory framework (International Monetary Fund, 2008; Gilbert
et al., 2009; Manuel, 2009; National Treasury, 2011; Kganyago, 2012). Moreover,
as noted at the end of chapter 2, the consolidation of the banking system created
a more oligopolistic system. Banks appear to have more pricing power, allowing
them a more diverse revenue stream, and less incentive to take on risk. This
reduction in competition may have financial stability benefits (Allen and Gale,
2004).
This chapter focusses on one aspect of the regulatory response, and evaluates
56
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the economic and financial effects of altering bank capital requirements in the lead
up to the global financial crisis. This also provides context to policy debate on the
use of proactive macroprudential policy tools.
In summary, the chapter finds that, although the two policy levers are comple-
mentary and not equivalent, a 1 percentage point shock to the capital adequacy
ratio is estimated to have similar effects on credit extension to an interest-rate
shock of between 0.3 and 0.4 percentage points. It has limited effects on inflation
and cannot substitute for a monetary policy tool. However, it is arguably most
useful in increasing financial resilience in small open economies facing credit shocks
driven by capital flows. It is important to ensure that macroprudential and interest
rate policy levers are used in a complementary manner to ensure that they do not
conflict.
3.2 The institutional setting
As the effects of the 2002/3 small bank crisis receded, credit growth rebounded.
South Africa benefited from the global ‘Great Moderation’, and between 2002
and 2007, South Africa experienced strong economic growth, low inflation, credit
growth, and rapid asset price increases. This growth, however, was mainly con-
sumption led, and supported by an increase in credit extension. As highlighted
in Table 3.1, during the 2002 to 2007 period, output expanded by 4.6 per cent a
year on average, and consumer price inflation remained comfortably within the 3
to 6 per cent target range. Private sector credit extension growth accelerated to
average 17.5 per cent a year, and house price growth averaged 20.2 per cent a year.
Against the backdrop of strong economic growth, fiscal policy was broadly
countercyclical. The fiscal deficit was 2.3 per cent in the fiscal year 2003/4. By
2006/7 this deficit had turned to a surplus of 1 per cent of GDP, an improvement of
3.3 percentage points in the budget balance (International Monetary Fund, 2008).
The South African banking supervisor became increasingly concerned with ac-
celerating credit growth. Changes to required capital adequacy levels can be linked
to three separate instances of regulatory intervention, with the dates indicated
in Figure 3.1: (1) On 22 April 2003, Bank Supervision Circular 8/2003 made a
number of changes to the quality of capital, which had the overall implication of
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Table 3.1: Selected macroeconomic variables, 1996 – 2012 (%)
Output Household Consumer Private sector House
growth† consumption prices credit extension price
growth† increase growth* growth*
1996 – 2001 2.8 3.2 6.5 13.3 10.6
2002 – 2007 4.6 5.4 4.2 17.5 20.2
2007 – 2012 2.7 3.0 6.5 11.0 4.6
Source: South African Reserve Bank, ABSA House Price index
† in real terms * in nominal terms
raising the quantity of capital held.
In particular, the treatment of preference shares was altered, which narrowed
the definition of regulatory capital. (2) On 20 February 2004, Bank Supervision
Circular 1/2004 set out the consultation on the implementation of Basel II. This
circular made it clear that banks would have to increase capital ahead of the full
implementation of Basel II on 1 January 2007. Moreover, this circular highlighted
that capital levels would be within the Registrar’s discretion1; and (3) on 13 De-
cember 2004, Circular 19/2004 made changes to calculations of quality of capital.
The effective date was January 2006. The changes included the revised definitions
that were required in terms of Basel III and clarified that at least 60 per cent of the
minimum required capital adequacy ratio had to consist of primary share capital,
without any reliance on hybrid debt instruments.
The overall effect of these circulars was that overall capital adequacy levels
rose from 11.96 per cent in March 2003 to 13.67 per cent in March 2005, i.e. by a
cumulative 171 bps. This exogenous imposition of an increased capital adequacy
requirement provides a unique opportunity to test the impact on the broader
economy.
1A detailed discussion of these changes can be found from page 26 of the Circular.
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Figure 3.1: Repo rate and capital adequacy (%)
In the years leading up to the global financial crisis, the monetary policy committee reduced the
repo rate (upper panel). At the same time, the Registrar of Banks increased capital adequacy
levels through three circulars (lower panel).
3.3 Related literature
This chapter contributes to a growing empirical literature on the use of tools
beyond interest rates to manage economic fluctuations and counteract financial
system risks, typically in the context of an inflation-targeting framework.2 Blan-
chard et al. (2010) summarise the view that ‘the policy rate is a poor tool to deal
2There is a well-established literature on standard economic models that include bank balance
sheets (Bernanke and Blinder, 1988, 1992), or on extensions that focus on the bank-lending
channel of monetary policy, particularly the interaction between monetary policy and the external
finance premium (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995), or on how monetary policy affects bank balance
sheets (Kashyap and Stein, 1995; Bernanke et al., 1999; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997) There was
also a theoretical understanding on interaction between low inflation and the build-up of financial
imbalances (Borio and Lowe, 2002).
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with excess leverage, excessive risk taking or apparent deviations of asset prices
from fundamentals.’
There are, however, conceptual difficulties with extending the central bank’s
toolkit beyond interest-rate policy. The proposed candidates for policy levers are
so-called ‘macroprudential’ tools, which are bank supervision (‘microprudential’)
tools applied to broader systemic goals.3
Theoretically, there are some difficulties with applying microprudential tools
for broader financial stability goals. The Modigliani-Miller theorem states that
cost of funding is independent of the type of funding. It follows that, theoretically,
a change in the balance of equity versus debt funding should have no impact on
banks funding costs or behaviour. However, Miller (1995) himself finds empirically
that Modigliani-Miller does not always hold true for banks.
The empirical literature is relatively mixed on the efficacy of changes to these
requirements. In a pre-crisis study, Aikman and Paustian (2006) shows an opposite
effect – well capitalised banks may have cheaper funding. Other studies show
limited impacts – for example Saurina (2009) finds that the dynamic provisioning
system adopted by the regulator in Spain in 2000 had little influence on stopping
the credit and real-estate boom (but did note that it may have dampened the
effects of the crisis). Dell’Ariccia et al. (2011) find that the use of increased
capital requirements and/or risk weights on types of real-estate loans are either
unsuccessful (Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia and the Ukraine) or a ‘partial success’
(Poland).
Another group of studies show an effect of capital on economic and finan-
cial outcomes. Mésonnier and Stevanovic (2013); Corbae and D’Erasmo (2014);
De Resende et al. (2016) and Mésonnier and Stevanovic (2017), show that an
increase in the capital-to-assets ratio reduces lending. In particular, Corbae and
D’Erasmo (2014) develop a theoretical model with large dominant banks and
smaller competitive fringe banks to show that a 2 percentage point increase in
capital requirements (a 50 per cent rise from 4 per cent to 6 per cent) causes
interest rates to rise by 50 basis points.
3For an overview of the origins of the term ‘macroprudential’ see Clement (2010), while for
comprehensive literature reviews of the subject see Galati and Moessner (2013), Turner (2012),
or Lim et al. (2011).
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A set of cross-country studies show that macroprudential policy measures
are relatively successful at reducing credit growth, particularly household credit
(Claessens et al., 2014; Cerutti et al., 2015). It is noted that emerging markets use
macroprudential policies more frequently, and that these policies are indeed more
effective in these jurisdictions. This is, in part, because their financial systems are
more closed, may be more prone to destabilising credit booms due to fixed exchange
rate, expansionary macroeconomic policy and low-quality banking supervision .
There is a small, but growing South African literature. The jurisdiction is
included in some of the panel regressions in Cerutti et al. (2015). Moreover,
Farrell (2016) calibrates potential countercyclical capital buffers using the Basel
committee guidance, concluding that a mechanical application may not be best
for the jurisdiction. Grobler and Smit (2015) include capital adequacy, liquidity
and financial sector neutral estimates of the output gap within a larger macroeco-
nomic model, and conclude that these have an impact on lending to households,
not dissimilar to results obtained in the empirical and theoretical international
literature. Liu and Molise (2018) consider the implications of introducing Basel 3.
Using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model (DSGE), they include an
endogenous macroprudential authority that responds to asset prices and interest
rate dislocations. They provide evidence that there are countercyclical effects
from the regulatory authorities raising capital requirements response to changes
in credit and output.
3.4 Methodology
3.4.1 The model
This chapter extends the National Treasury Quarterly Model, the main government
policy model. The model has a theoretical basis in the IS-LM framework, which
is the approach taken in many of the similar studies, including the Bank of
International Settlements Macroeconomic Assessment Group study. Alternative
approaches were considered, including a vector autoregression (VAR), vector-error
correction model (VECM) or a DSGE. These approaches have costs and benefits.
In particular, small models do not cover all possible interlinkages. As will be
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discussed, smaller models do not necessarily include open economy dynamics. The
DSGE literature on the topic is still in its early stages, with notable contributions
from Curdia and Woodford (2010) and Liu and Molise (2018). Moreover, the
model has a carefully calibrated and tested monetary-transmission mechanism,
and ensuring that this channel is correct is crucial for the analysis.
The model shares many similarities with several other models, both internation-
ally (e.g. the Federal Reserve Board’s model (FRB-US) and the Bank of England
Quarterly Model) and in South Africa (e.g. the South African Reserve Bank Model
described in Smal et al. (2007); De Jager et al. (2015) and the Stellenbosch Bureau
of Economic Research model summarised in Grobler and Smit (2015)).
A key weakness of structural models of this type is the well-known Lucas Jr
(1976) critique: estimated parameters may not be robust to policy actions. This
problem can to some extent be overcome by estimating deep structural parameters,
a task Fuhrer and Estrella (1999) call ‘extraordinarily daunting’, or relying on
theoretically-specified models with calibrated parameters. Two notable South
African examples of such theoretically-grounded models are Jooste and Marinkov
(2012) and De Jager et al. (2015).
While the Lucas critique should be considered, it comes with an important
caveat that means it is not necessarily fatal. Fuhrer and Estrella (1999) note that
backward-looking fitted models produce more stable results than forward-looking
specified models, possibly because expectations are formed on an adaptive rather
than rational basis. Moreover, models such as these, particularly the Federal
Reserve model, are widely used for policy analysis despite potential Lucas-critique
weaknesses. Indeed, these models are not expositional models but rather the
workhorses of a policy environment, with their results used as input into fiscal and
monetary policy decision making in their institutions (Tulip, 2011).
The variant of the model used in this analysis is in this tradition, and is a
relatively standard large-scale IS-LM model containing a set of estimated equa-
tions. At the heart of the model is a demand function (equation 3.1 below), which
states that in line with the standard approach demand y is function of income,
yd, interest rates, i, government spending, g, and external factors, s. Then a
supply function (equation 3.2) for y∗ specifies that supply is a Cobb-Douglas type
combination of technology, capital stock and labour. These two balance through
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prices and interest rates (equation 3.3 and 3.4), such that prices are anchored
by expectations, pe, when there is a positive output gap, y − y∗, or when wages
rise, w. The policy rate, i is specified as a Taylor rule, and is a function of price
expectations, the output gap and a measure of the natural interest rate, in this
case given as the global risk-free rate, i∗, and the risk premium, ir.
y = f(yd, i, g, s) (3.1)
y∗ = f(A,K,L) (3.2)
p = f(pe,
wL
y
, y − y∗) (3.3)
i = f(pe, y − y∗, i∗ + ir) (3.4)
This is a high-level structure of the model, and in practice the model is a disag-
gregated version of the scheme laid out above. For example, y is disaggregated into
its constituent components, viz. consumption expenditure, residential investment,
non-residential investment, government consumption expenditure, government in-
vestment expenditure, exports and imports and so forth. Moreover, there is an
implicit yield curve – the ten-year yield is a function of the policy rate and the
fiscal position. This ensures that the model is internally consistent– for example,
an increase in government consumption expenditure increases demand but also
raises the fiscal deficit and long-run borrowing costs.
3.4.2 Introducing capital adequacy as a policy variable
Capital adequacy is introduced into the empirical model based on the theoretical
contribution of Cecchetti and Kohler (2012),4 and the extension proposed by
Du Plessis et al. (2011), where two distinct short-term interest rates are included:
ρ, the rate at which banks lend, and i, the interest rate on bonds.
Cecchetti and Kohler (2012) extend the IS-LM-CC intuition and more exten-
sively specify the factors that may influence ρ, the rate at which banks lend to the
4Their contribution is in turn based on Bernanke and Blinder (1988, 1992), where the rate
at which banks lend, ρ, is a function of not only the policy rate, i, but also demand (y) and the
level of reserves (R), ρ = ϕ(i+, y+, R−)
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economy and that is associated with equilibrium in output and inflation. To see
the derivation, first, assume that aggregate demand yd is given by:
yd = −α(ρ− pie)− β(i− pie)− δpi + η (3.5)
where pie is expected inflation, pi is current inflation and η a white noise random
variable, and the parameters are α, β and δ. The short-term rate i is set by policy
makers, while the lending rate is determined by equilibrium in the lending market.
Aggregate supply (ys) is specified in a relatively simple fashion as a function
of expected and unexpected inflation and an error term:
ys = γ(pi − pie) + ε (3.6)
Loan supply is given by assuming that banks are constrained by the capital
that they hold, such that:
LS = −κ.k + τ.by (3.7)
where k is the capital requirement and y is output, with κ the parameter for
the capital requirement, and b is a ratio of bank capital to real output (assuming
bank capital rises as output rises), such that the overall level of bank capital is by.
The parameter τ reflects sensitivity of loan supply to bank capital (by).
Loan demand is, in a modified version of the IS-LM-CC derivation above, given
as:
Ld = −φ(ρ− pie) + ωy (3.8)
Equilibrium conditions are obtained by setting ys = yd = y and Ld = LS, and
assuming rational expections, expected inflation can be normalized to zero.
From the equilibrium conditions, the derivation for the equilibrium lending rate
is given as:
ρ∗ =
(
δ(ω − bτ)
A
)
ε+
(
γ(ω − bτ)
A
)
η +
(
βγ(ω − bτ)
A
)
i+
(
κ(γ + δ)
A
)
k (3.9)
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In summary, ρ∗ is function of white noise error ε, a transitory demand shock
η, the rate on bonds, i, and the capital requirement imposed on banks, k.
3.4.3 Calculating a series for ρ
In this analysis, we wish to distinguish econometrically between ρ, the effective
lending rate, and i, the policy rate. Fundamentally, the thesis is that these may
diverge over time. Calculating the value of ρ thus provides an important insight
into how relatively tight or loose monetary policy conditions are. In this paper,
the value of ρ is approximated as an imputed interest rate, following Rice and Ors
(2006) and Curdia and Woodford (2010):
ρ =
I
L
(3.10)
where I is the interest income earned on the outstanding stock of loans in the
banking system, L. 5
3.4.4 Econometric technique
Each equation is estimated using a single equation co-integration technique (Engle
and Granger, 1987; Wickens and Breusch, 1988; Pesaran and Smith, 1995). This
involves the simultaneous estimation of the long- and short-run parameters within
a unrestricted error correction autoregressive distributed lag model, ARDL(p, q).
In this approach, each equation is estimated as:
∆yt = φηt−1
p−1∑
j=1
λj∆yt−1 +
q−1∑
j=0
δ′j∆xt−j + µ0 + ε (3.11)
5This approach to calculating the series has both advantages and disadvantages. The major
advantage is that it is easy to calculate, particularly across multiple asset classes and loan books.
This provides information in terms of differentiated interest rates across different clients, and
hence the interest rate on different asset classes. The major disadvantage is that it is the average
interest income across the book, not the marginal interest income. Put another way, it simply
measures total interest income, even on loans originated a number of years previously. It does
not reflect the rate of interest on new lending, nor does it give insight into how much income has
not been received (e.g. from non-performing loans). However, most loans in South Africa are
variable rate, and so the average rate and the marginal rate tend to be the same. Finally, for
the period this paper covers, non-performing loans were stable.
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Figure 3.2: Effective lending rate and the repo rate (2002 – 2007)
The effective lending rate, ρ and the overnight policy rate (repo) track each other, except notably
from 2004 onward, where the effective lending rate rose relative to the repo rate.
where ηi = yt−θ′xt and t denotes time periods, yt is a scalar dependent variable,
xt is the kx1 vector of (weakly exogenous) regressors, µ0 is a constant, ηt is the
error-correction term, φ is a scalar that measures the speed of adjustment to long-
term equilibrium, β is the kx1 vector of coefficients on the explanatory variables,
θ = −β/φ is a kx1 vector of the long-run coefficients, λj are scalar coefficients
on lagged first-differences of dependent variables and δj are kx1 coefficient vectors
on first difference of explanatory variables and their lagged values. It is assumed
that the disturbance term εt is independently distributed with a zero mean and a
constant positive variance.
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3.5 Results
3.5.1 Single equation results for ρ
Following the theoretical framework discussed above, the effective lending rate ρ
is introduced.6 In table 3.2, I present the findings of the single equation results.
For exposition purposes, I report the long-run component of the ARDL(p, q). It
is important to highlight that because of the economy-wide effects, the impulse
responses in section 3.5.4 below give a better interpretation of the economy-wide
co-efficients.
The estimations show a strong long-run cointegrating relationship between the
effective lending rate (as a dependent variable) and the repo rate and capital
adequacy ratio. In itself, this is the most significant finding: an increase in the
capital adequacy ratio leads to a rise in the effective lending rate. This immedi-
ately suggests that capital adequacy ratios may influence the lending channel of
monetary policy.
A related finding, presented in specification 3 and 4, is that there is evidence
of long-run homogeneity between the policy rate and the lending rate. Economet-
rically, the Wald test does not reject the hypothesis of a unit coefficient on the
long-run structural equation parameter. This is important both theoretically and
for model stability. Theoretically, short-run deviations between the policy rate
and the bank lending rate can be expected, but in the long run they should move
together.
Nevertheless, the capital adequacy ratio is a statistically significant influence
in the long-run component of the equation. A statistically significant and positive
finding indicates that higher capital adequacy levels lead to higher bank lend-
ing rates, which in turn have implications for the broader economy. Estimated
equation number 3.7 shows that the calculated long-run coefficient on the capi-
tal adequacy ratio is 0.44, in line with the theoretical prediction and graphical
relationship shown in Figure 3.2.
I then test for various measures of demand, to understand to what extent this
6For a discussion on how the monetary transmission mechanism is dealt with in a large
macroeconomic model, see Bernanke and Blinder (1992); Smal et al. (2007); De Jager et al.
(2015)
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may influence the bank lending rate. Two are reported in Table 3.2, viz. output
and house prices. The latter is most commonly used in the econometric literature.
However, the model does not converge when endogenous demand variables are
used. For this reason, a variable exogenous to the model is used. This is a
composite house-price measure, which has a 99 per cent correlation with real GDP.
It is thus a useful instrument.
The available data means only nine years of quarterly data are available, and
seven years of monthly data. This may appear to be a relatively short time series.
It is, however, consistent with time series length used in various other international
studies. However, to test co-efficient stability, the single equation is estimated
using monthly data. This provides 84 observations, a substantial improvement
over the quarterly data. The results, presented in Table 3.2 as specification 5,
suggest that the coefficients are robust.
3.5.2 The introduction of ρ into the broader model
Based on model stability and performance, specification (4) reported in Table
3.2 is chosen for inclusion in the model. In addition, ρ is introduced into the
model in two further places – the estimation of household credit extension and
real consumption expenditure. These were previously a function of i, and were
re-estimated to be instead a function of ρ. Both of these equations feed into the
overall income and demand specification, i.e. as part of a group of equations that
form part of the more detailed specification of the reduced form model presented
above. Theoretically, the intuition is that both these variables are influenced by
the bank lending rate. The long bond rate remains a function of the repo rate.
This is an important distinction that drives some of the results presented below:
the idea is that financial-market interest rates fluctuate according to the overnight
policy rate, and real economy variables are a function of lending rates. Of course,
the imposition of long-run homogeneity means that in the long run this distinction
is irrelevant.
It is then possible to specify a new block that includes equation 3.9 with the
unrestricted parameters.
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Consumption and credit extension
For the equilibrium level of credit extension, one can derive a function from the
equilibrium loan demand and loan supply functions provided in equation 3.7 and
equation 3.8 above, substitute in for ρ and specify this as:
∆Lh = ε+ β1yt + β7ρ
∗ (3.12)
such that credit extension to households (the change in the equilibrium loan
stock, ∆Lh) is a function of a measure of demand, y and the equilibrium lending
rate, ρ∗.
In table 3.3, I present the results of the estimated function for private household
credit extension. It is notable that there is a positive cointegrating relationship
between household credit extension and house prices, supporting the findings in
some of the literature discussed above that rising asset prices stimulate additional
credit. As expected, the long-run coefficient on the effective lending rate is neg-
ative (-0.009), with a relatively long lag (six quarters), in line with the empirical
findings that monetary policy changes have long lags through the economy (see,
for example, Botha et al. (2017)). I test for a short-run demand effect but this is
not shown to be significant.
The consumption function in the model can be extended to include the bank
lending rate:
yc = ε+ β4yd + β5ρ (3.13)
which is a simplified function that household consumption yc is a function of
household disposable income yd and the effective lending rate ρ. The estimated
results are reported in Table 3.4. I present three versions of the estimation. In
specification (1), the relationship between household consumption and disposable
income is unrestricted. The estimated long-run relationship is 1.09 (calculated as
0.289/0.265). In specifications (2) and (3), I impose long-run homogeneity, that is
that there is a homogenous relationship between disposable income and household
consumption. The relevant Wald test for homogeneity, reported in the lower panel
of Table 3.4 is does not reject the null. The estimated parameters are as expected.
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3.5.3 Weak exogeneity
The inherent pro-cyclical (and hence endogenous) nature of bank capital require-
ments had been identified as early as 2001 as a concern (Borio et al., 2001). Dur-
ing benign economic conditions, risk-based bank capital requirements encourage
additional lending, further exacerbating potential credit-induced asset bubbles.
This is because asset price increases supposedly reduce the potential loss when
the loan goes bad. During economic downturns, bank capital requirements be-
come increasingly onerous, discouraging lending, and exacerbating already-weak
economic conditions, creating a ‘credit crunch’ (Bikker and Hu, 2002; Covas and
Fujita, 2010), which may indeed amplify business cycles (Aliaga-Díaz and Olivero,
2012).
The approach taken in this study is to use a period where the banking su-
pervisor exogenously increased capital adequacy levels. This differs from other
studies where bank capital levels are used where there is no evidence that these
are exogenously determined.
Nevertheless, the study does use observed capital adequacy levels, which may
under certain circumstances be endogenous. Endogeneity may arise if non per-
forming loans are correlated with other variables in the model.
The weak exogeneity can be tested in a number of ways. By observation,
the ratio of non performing loans remains stable, indicating that the variation
in observed capital adequacy can be ascribed to regulatory action rather than to
non-performing loans. Indeed, theoretically, the improving economic conditions
should lead to capital adequacy levels falling rather than rising.
More formally, this can also be tested econometrically. In Table 3.5, I present
the results of the weak exogeneity test following Johansen (1992, 1995). In the
Johansen (1995) framework, the test is whether the variable of interest’s speed of
adjustment vector, αi,j is equal to zero in the cointegration system. The first two
rows of Table 3.5 present a summary of the cointegration test under a number of
different approaches (no intercept / no trend, etc.) From this, there appears to
be one cointegrating relationship for intercept / no trend and linear data trend
with intercept / no trend. Two cointegrating relationships are present for linear
intercept / trend and for a quadratic intercept and tred. The null hypothesis of
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αi,j = 0 is not rejected in the presence of one co-integrating vector, but rejected
in the presence of two cointegrating vectors.
Based on the theoretical case for weak exogeneity, and the test statistics, I
proceed on the basis of one cointegrating relationship and weak exogeneity.
Table 3.5: Co-integration and Weak exogeneity test
Data Trend: None None Linear Linear Quadratic
Test Type No Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept
No Trend No Trend No Trend Trend Trend
Trace 0 1 1 2 3
Max-Eig 0 1 1 2 3
Restriction α2,2 = 0†
χ2 0.377445 0.437597 9.62206 9.701057
Probability 0.538974 0.508285 0.008139 0.007824
† α2,2 corresponds to the adjustment coefficent for the capital adequacy ratio. The
null is that the capital adequacy ratio is weakly exogenous. The test is the LR test for
binding restrictions (rank = 1) – see Johansen (1995).
3.5.4 Impulse responses
To measure the economy-wide effects, the effects of an increase in capital adequacy
ratio are modelled and compared to a change in the repo rate.
Ex ante, one can expect a widening of the spread between rho and repo, with
consequent slowdown in lending (through the credit extension link) and slowdown
in the economy (through both credit extension and consumption expenditure).
Building on some of the insights in Cecchetti-Kohler, four separate scenarios are
run, summarised in Figure 3.3.
The first scenario considers a transitory (four-quarter) increase in the capital
adequacy ratio. Given the interaction between macroprudential and monetary
policy tools, two scenarios are considered. In Scenario 1a, the repo rate is kept
exogenous, while in Scenario 1b, the repo rate is endogenous. The endogenous
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response function of the repo rate is based on a standard Taylor-rule specification,
calibrated on previous monetary policy responses to inflation and the output gap.
The intuition is that an increase in the countercyclical capital buffer causes growth
and inflation to decline, which may lead the monetary policy authority to reduce
rates. (See the discussion below on the policy implications of how the two tools
interact).
In short, the use of a countercyclical capital buffer as a tool should not be seen
in isolation of other central bank levers.
Figure 3.3: Summary of scenarios
In the first part of the analysis, Four scenarios are considered to test the response of the model.
Note: the shock for Scenario 1a and 1b is identical, but the model response differs.
For the purposes of comparison, Scenario 2 models the effect of a 40 bps
increase in the repo rate. The choice of size of shock reflects the initial finding that
a capital adequacy ratio shock increases the bank lending rate by 0.4 percentage
points. The results of this policy tool versus the countercyclical capital ratio can
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thus be directly compared. This also underlines the advantages of using a standard
policy model, with a well-specified monetary policy transmission mechanism.
Scenario 3 considers the effect of a permanent increase in the capital adequacy
ratio, with the repo rate responding through a Taylor rule.
Effect on the effective lending rate
The set-up of the model is that the increase in capital adequacy feeds through to
changes in the bank lending rate, ρ. The results, presented in Figure 3.4, are as
expected, with an overall increase in the bank lending rate of approximately 0.4
percentage points. As noted, with an endogenous repo rate response the repo rate
declines. This feeds through to a slightly lower overall bank lending rate.
Figure 3.4: Impact on effective lending rate
The effect on the rest of the model is broadly as expected, but of note is the very
small effect that the shock has on macroeconomic variables: growth declines by
0.07 percentage points, while consumer price inflation excluding mortgage costs7
7At that time, this was still the official measure, and is thus included in the model as such.
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drops by between 0.02 and 0.03 percentage points.8 Although the detailed results
are not reported here, it is important to note that the impact on consumer price
inflation is substantially less than that of a repo shock. This suggests that the
countercyclical capital buffer cannot ‘replace’ the interest rate as the primary tool
of monetary policy.
Figure 3.5: Impulse response: Credit extension
The main driver of the economic effects is through the change in credit ex-
tension, presented in Figure 3.5). In Scenario 1a and 1b, credit extension is
temporarily lower by approximately 0.5 per cent relative to the baseline forecast.
This is a marginally smaller decline than the equivalent repo shock. However, the
repo shock is more persistent, in part because (as noted below), the repo shock has
additional implications on the exchange rate and on long-term interest rates. The
exchange rate appreciates and long-term interest rates rise, which has a further
8The BIS results were a decline of about 0.03 percentage points in the average growth rate
per 1 percentage point rise in capital.
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dampening effect on credit. Because the exchange rate does not adjust due to
capital adequacy changes, this second-round effect does not occur.
The impact on the exchange rate and long-term interest rates
The response of the real exchange rate, bond yields, output and prices is presented
in Figure 3.6.
The result for the real effective exchange rate demonstrates the particular
advantage of a macroprudential tool, such as the capital adequacy ratio, over
that of the policy rate.
There is a notably different exchange-rate response for a capital-adequacy shock
and an interest-rate shock. This arises largely because the exchange rate is a
function of interest rates: the model assumes uncovered interest-rate parity holds,
and moreover, the policy rate affects long-term interest rates.
The impact on inflation and growth
The limits of the countercyclical capital adequacy ratio, however, are borne out
by the effects on inflation and growth. Changes to the capital adequacy ratio have
very small effects on both. This is because, in the model, the capital adequacy ratio
does not lead to a significant change in either the exchange rate or government
bond yields. In the model, movements in the exchange rate impact on inflation
through pass-through effects. Changes to bond yields impact on growth through
changes to investment (an increase in the bond yield leads to a decline).
3.5.5 Counterfactual scenario
The section above presented impulse responses to a set of innovations. In this
section, I present the results in terms of a ‘no action’ counterfactual scenario.
I rerun the model and test what the outcome would have been if the banking
supervisor had not increased capital adequacy requirements (i.e. kept the capital
adequacy ratio constant).
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Figure 3.6: Impulse responses: Selected variables
The two policy tools have notably different effects on the real exchange rate (Panel 1), bond
yields (Panel 2), output (Panel 3) and prices (Panel 4).
Counterfactual: All variables
The model computes the results for all variables that are included – i.e. a full
counterfactual scenario. For brevity, here I only report the impact on six variables.
As expected, the effective lending rate is lower (approximately 2 percentage points
lower) in the counterfactual scenario, which leads to increased credit extension
(approximately 4 percent higher). The effect on overall output is mild, with output
only expected to rise by 0.3 percent. Other variables are relatively unaffected,
except for a mild appreciation of the real effective exchange rate.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
80 Chapter 3. Why did SA not experience a banking crisis in 2008?
Figure 3.7: Model counterfactual
Six major macroeconomic variables are predicted based on a counterfactual of no change in the
capital adequacy ratio over the period.
Counterfactual: The credit cycle
The results from the credit extension counterfactual can then be used to generate a
counterfactual credit cycle. To generate this cycle, a band-pass filter is applied to
the data series. A band-pass filter isolates the component of a time series that lies
within a particularly band of frequencies (Christiano and Fitzgerald, 2003). The
ideal band-pass filter would use a time series of an infinite length, but naturally in
practice such a series does not exist, and typically some sort of approximation is
required, and, for short and long series, backcasting and forecasting are options.
A similar approach is used on South African data in Farrell and Kemp (2017).
Comin and Gertler (2006) argue that medium term cycles are more useful
measures of fluctuations as more standard detrending methods (e.g. the well-
known Hodrick-Prescott filter) may miss medium term structural variations. For
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this reason Drehmann et al. (2012) chose to follow the methodology for calculating
financial cycles.
The approach laid out in Comin and Gertler (2006, 526) is followed. Prior to
running the band-pass filter, the variables (credit, credit to GDP, house prices) are
converted into growth rates by taking log differences. Following Drehmann et al.
(2012), the annual growth rate is used for quarterly data. This is to ensure that
when longer annual data sets are used, the data set is more comparable.
In this analysis, I report the credit cycle and not the full cycle. Farrell and
Kemp (2017) demonstrate that the credit cycle drives the majority of the move-
ment in the overall cycle, and the other variables used in the cycle are not specified
as endogenous in the model.
Figure 3.8: Credit cycle counterfactual
This compares a counterfactual of no capital adequacy increase with the actual outcome. In the
counterfactual of no increase in capital adequacy, there is a notable acceleration of the credit
cycle.
In Figure 3.8, the credit cycle is presented together with a counterfactual of no
regulatory action. This analysis shows that the regulatory action dampened the
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peak of financial cycle at an important time (during the course of 2006 to 2007)
as the international economy was overheating and nearing the events of 2007 that
ultimately led to the 2008 global financial crisis.
3.6 Lessons for the policy framework
Beau et al. (2012) and Sinclair and Farrell (2017) provide a simple, but effective,
mechanism to understand the interaction between the monetary policy tool and a
macroprudential policy tool such as the countercyclical capital buffer (see Table
3.6). In this approach, the authorities determine both financial stability conditions
and monetary conditions. Financial stability is considered as the degree of imbal-
ance in financial markets – typically using a standard metric such as the credit-
to-GDP ratio, complemented by analysis of financial market conditions (for a
discussion on the difficulties with various measures, see Havemann (2013) or Farrell
(2016)). Monetary conditions are considered using the standard inflation-rate
targeting framework. It is the interaction between the two tools that creates the
difficulties, however. When there is both ‘financial exuberance’ and ‘high inflation’,
the economy is clearly overheating, and a mix of monetary and macroprudential
policy tools can be deployed. Policy decisions are not always that clear cut – the
approach highlights that tools can, under certain conditions, be in conflict.
In the South African case (as with many emerging markets), the zero lower
bound does not bind. This creates more scope for coordinated policy setting,
allowing for the deployment of a mix of interest rate and macroprudential tools.
This framework can also be extended to consider the sequencing of policy
decisions, and the degree of coordination (Cecchetti and Kohler, 2012; Du Plessis
et al., 2011). Policies can be set independently, in a coordinated way, or as
Stackelberg-type game.9 This appears to describe the 2002 – 2007 experience
outlined above best. The banking supervisor responded to interest-rate decisions.
The ‘initial play’ of interest rate cuts stimulated credit. Against the backdrop
of benign global conditions, a domestic ‘credit bubble’ developed. The regulator
observed this ‘play’ and ‘outcome’ and responded by raising system-wide capital
9Stackelberg is where one policy maker sets the policy without considering the impact on the
other. Then the second policy maker sets his or her policy, taking the first decision as given.
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adequacy levels.
Table 3.6: Interaction between macroprudential and monetary policy
Expected inflation
Over target Near target Under target
Financial exuberance Complement Independent Conflict
No imbalance Independent Independent Independent
Financial deflation Conflict Independent Complement
Source: Beau et al. (2012)
One further extension to consider is a Cournot Nash equilibrium, where the two
decision makers are aware of each other’s best play, have nearly equally matched
power, and play accordingly. The outcome is a standard Nash equilibrium.
A jointly-determined equilibrium is particularly relevant where the central
bank has both a financial stability and inflation-targeting mandate, and has two
committees with overlapping membership jointly determining a strategy.
One approach to a such a coordinated outcome is to adjust the monetary
authorities reaction function to include financial stability. A particularly workable
approach is a modified Taylor rule, where financial stability is explicitly included
in the central bank policy reaction function. Notable examples of work in this
tradition include Taylor (2009), which lays out a potential framework, Curdia
and Woodford (2010) which incorporates an endogenous reaction function into a
new Keynesian model and Angelini et al. (2014) which includes it in a DSGE
framework.
As a small-open economy, for South Africa, a practical example of imple-
menting these tools is in the context of an external shock, where a combination
of monetary and macroprudential policy tools can provide for a more nuanced
response. An example of such a shock is a capital inflow shock, which presents
particular difficulties for policy makers in small-open economies. Such shocks are,
in certain circumstances, expansionary, creating the well-known ‘policy dilemma’,
summarised by Blanchard et al. (2016):
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For a given policy rate, bond inflows lead to an appreciation and are
contractionary. For a given policy rate, non-bond inflows also lead to
an appreciation, but they also decrease the cost of borrowing, and their
net effect may be expansionary.
Raising interest rates to deal with inflows may cause additional flows (non-
bonds and bonds) and have the unintended consequence of reinforcing or even
exacerbating the expansionary shock. Moreover, the appreciation of the exchange
rate has the perverse outcome of dampening inflation, creating precisely the sce-
nario of ‘financial exuberance’ / ‘under target’ inflation.
The results presented above suggest that the central bank could consider damp-
ening the expansionary effect of inflows by raising the capital adequacy ratio. This
has the desired effect of reducing credit growth and dampening demand, without
the consequence of the exchange rate channel.
Nevertheless, macroprudential policy is no ‘silver bullet’ to deal with an open
capital account. Caruana et al. (2014), for example, summarise the literature that
concludes that the adjustment to capital inflows should first take place through
the exchange rate, and potentially fiscal policy and interest rate policy, with
macroprudential policy playing a complementary role.
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter posited that one of the reasons for South Africa successfully weath-
ering the global financial crisis was proactive countercyclical regulatory policy.
The chapter set out to empirically determine the effect on the economy of using
counter-cyclical capital adequacy buffers, using South Africa’s experience. The
results suggest that such buffers can be useful to lean against credit cycles, but
that capital adequacy increases may need to be quite large to have any meaningful
impact on credit extension or on economic activity (towards the upper end of the
0 to 2.5 per cent of risk-weighted assets proposed in the guidance to authorities).
Indeed, using the pre-crisis experience of South Africa, it is estimated that a 1
percentage point increase in the capital adequacy ratio has an economy-wide effect
of approximately the same as an increase in the policy rate of 0.3 to 0.4 percentage
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
3.7. Conclusion 85
points. Put another way, to achieve the same result as an increase in the policy
rate of 1 percentage point, capital adequacy ratios would need to rise by between
2.5 and 3 percentage points.
The two tools have subtly different macroeconomic effects. Increasing capital
adequacy ratios impacts on bank lending rates, while other interest rates (e.g.
the long government bond rate) are largely unchanged. This means far less of
an effect on the real exchange rate; indeed, with the growth decline, the real
exchange rate may actually depreciate. This is particularly useful for countries that
are experiencing credit booms fuelled by capital flows, where an interest increase
could have a priori ambiguous effects on credit extension. Also, consistent with
the Bank of International Settlement Macroeconomic Assessment Group results,
capital adequacy ratio increases have very small growth impacts.
The results suggest that there is merit in introducing macroprudential policy
tools to complement monetary policy tools, as part of a broader toolkit of policy
measures for managing macroeconomic fluctuations.
This chapter considered the use of proactive tools to dampen financial cycles.
But what if a failure occurs? The next chapter considers the use of new bank
resolution tools to manage the financial spillovers from bank failures.
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African Bank and the
money-market run of 2014
African Bank was placed into curatorship in August 2014. The authorities used
new post-crisis bank resolution tools to impose losses on creditors. The bank was
mainly funded by money-market and other mutual funds. Over fifteen money-
market funds broke the buck, the most significant such event since the collapse
of Reserve Primary Fund. I show that the bail-in led to some financial spillovers,
but these were limited due to the central bank undertaking complementary in-
terventions such as imposing gating restrictions on funds and providing liquidity
assistance to banks and non-banks.
4.1 Introduction
The costs of the global financial crisis highlighted the need for ‘burden-sharing
arrangements’, which aim to share the costs of bank failures between creditors and
government. These reforms include ‘creditor bail-in’ and ‘contingent convertible
bonds’. The former is a mechanism to write-down the claims of creditors during
the bank resolution process. The latter creates powers to convert debt to equity,
contingent on a specified event. The resolution of African Bank,1 a small monoline
1Throughout the text, African Bank refers to African Bank Ltd, registered as a bank.
References to the broader group are African Bank Investments Ltd.
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South African lender, presents a unique opportunity to study the spillover effects
of using these new tools. The bank was almost exclusively funded by wholesale (i.e.
not retail) funding, with a notable portion (6.9 per cent) of its funding from mutual
funds, particularly money-market funds. It is one of the first emerging market
bank resolutions that included the bail-in of creditors, and, following the bail-in,
there were substantial money-market fund redemptions, with potential contagion
through financial interlinkages.2 All affected money-market funds ‘broke the buck’,
the most significant such episode since the breaking of the buck by Reserve Primary
Fund on September 16, 2008.
The paper exploits a unique data set, containing both daily and quarterly
frequencies, including data down to mutual fund holdings at financial-instrument
level. Controlling for other factors which may influence redemption patterns, I
show that redemptions occurred disproportionately in money-market funds with
African Bank exposure. There is evidence of financial spillovers to the rest of
the financial system, albeit limited. A larger failure, a larger haircut, or a poorly-
designed resolution could potentially have triggered broader spillover with possible
systemic consequences, including contagion to other banks.
The impact on constant net asset value money-market funds is compared to
that of variable net asset value income funds.3 Outflows from the latter were
smaller, adding to evidence that constant net asset value funds are a source of risk
themselves.
The implication is that creditor bail-in is a potentially useful resolution tool,
but needs to be used carefully. The systemic consequences can be reduced through
a transparent and clear ex ante bail-in framework, supported by enhanced regu-
lation of mutual funds, particularly money-market funds, to reduce their fragility.
Regulatory reforms can reduce the systemic risk posed by money-market funds,
e.g. phasing out constant net asset value and introducing powers to impose
discretionary liquidity restrictions and suspend convertibility.
In section 2, I highlight how this paper contributes to the related literature,
particularly the literature on bail-in and money-market funds. Section 3 provides
2Contagion is defined following Iyer and Peydro (2011) that ‘[t]here is contagion if the failure
of a bank causes a significant negative externality to other banks’.
3Constant net asset value (C-NAV) mutual funds maintain a unit net asset value. In contrast,
variable net asset funds (V-NAV) mutual funds have a fluctuating market price.
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the institutional setting, including the relevant global regulatory reforms. Section
4 sets out the event, highlighting how the bail-in of African Bank creditors was
achieved. The following two sections outline the data and empirical strategy. The
final section concludes.
4.2 Related literature
The paper contributes to a small but growing literature on the practicalities and
potential unintended consequences of bail-in and contingent convertible bonds,
particularly that using these tools may magnify rather than dampen systemic risk
during failures (see, for example, Goodhart (2010), Geithner (2014), Avgouleas
and Goodhart (2015) and Hüser et al. (2017)). The paper presents a case study4
and so also links to the literature on individual bank runs or groups of runs in the
tradition of Iyer et al. (2012), Shin (2009) and Iyer et al. (2016).
The paper also provides insights on how money-market funds behave when
faced with an idiosyncratic shock. This literature notes that money-market funds
with a constant net asset value (C-NAV) provide an implicit capital guarantee,
making them analagous to banks without deposit insurance. These funds may
thus be more susceptible to runs and specific types of runs.5
Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2013) examine money-market funds in the run-up
to the global financial crisis noting evidence that fund inflows were positively
correlated with fund risk. More risky funds also suffered larger runs follow-
ing shocks. Moreover, money-market funds do have liquidity mismatches, albeit
limited. A sudden increase in demand for redemptions has a similar impact
on a money-market fund as a sudden increase in demand for uninsured bank
deposits, with Wermers (2012), and a related paper Schmidt et al. (2016) noting
that illiquidity may create strategic complementarities. In the United States, for
4Prior to this case, the most notable example was the 2013 bail-in of depositors in Cyprus.
From 2016, bail-in became mandatory in EU member states as part of the Bank Recovery and
Resolution Directive. For a review of European case studies see The World Bank (2016).
5This literature in turn builds on the seminal papers on bank runs, in particular Diamond
and Dybvig (1983), and the information effects in Postlewaite and Vives (1987), Bryant (1980),
Chari and Jagannathan (1988) and Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988). Signals are considered in
Carlsson and van Damme (1993), Morris and Shin (2000), Morris and Shin (2003) and Goldstein
and Pauzner (2005).
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example, Chen et al. (2010) find that money-market mutual funds with more
illiquid assets experience a larger outflow in response to bad news. The relative
illiquidity of corporate bonds may create either first-mover advantages or strategic
complementarities. A related effect is that of the ‘flight from maturity’ (Gorton
et al., 2014).
Schmidt et al. (2016) argue that, after a shock, redemptions by ‘sophisticated’
investors should be larger. Money-market funds are also often underwritten by
‘sponsors’, which Acharya et al. (2013) find could precipitate contagion by impos-
ing losses on the sponsor, typically a bank.
Large redemptions from money-market funds may create financial spillovers
in multiple other ways, including that the bail-in of one bank may cause concern
about common exposures, and mutual fund managers may decide to pre-emptively
liquidate holdings of banks with similar assets (Allen and Gale, 2000; Ahnert and
Georg, 2018). Asset managers may also choose to liquidate assets to meet large
redemption requests, causing fire sales (Morris et al., n.d.), which may create a
‘cascade of defaults’ (Battiston et al., 2012) and create a fall in transaction values.
Money-market funds may have exposures to multiple banks, and banks may in turn
have large exposures to money-market funds. This series of overlapping claims
creates an opaque network, which may make a financial system intermediated by
money-market funds more fragile (Cipriani et al., 2014; Hüser et al., 2017).
This paper also links to the literature on signals – bail-in arguably provides
a signal to players about the financial position of similar banks. Morris and
Shin (1999) posit that in a global games setting with firms facing liquidation,
intervention by public authorities may solve a co-ordination problem, reducing
the likelihood of a messy, inefficient liquidation. Baeriswyl and Cornand (2010)
note that authorities may well use policy signals to influence behavior. That said,
importantly for this analysis, Angeletos et al. (2006) argue that policy interventions
may create multiple equilibria, with the decision maker caught in a trap where his
or her decision dictates both the coordination outcome and thus, by deduction,
the policy intervention. The signals also cause participants to update information
about other banks (Allen and Gale, 2000; Acharya, 2009; Allen et al., 2011; Cipriani
et al., 2014; Ahnert and Georg, 2018).
There is also a strand of money-market fund literature considering the effect
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
90 Chapter 4. African Bank and the money-market run of 2014
of various regulatory reform proposals. Here I examine the performance of vari-
able net asset value funds against constant net asset value funds and the use of
discretionary liquidity facilities, illustrating some of the findings in the theoretical
literature (see, for example, Parlatore (2016)) that argues that adopting a variable
net asset value reduces the risk to investing in money-market funds (as they are
inherently less fragile), but also reduces the potential return, with mixed effects
on liquidity.
4.3 The institutional setting
4.3.1 The regulatory reforms
The regulatory reforms that introduce ‘bail-in’ and ‘contingent convertible’ (or
‘co-co’) debt are intended to provide an alternative to ‘bail-out’. When a bank
faces a solvency shortfall, bail-in gives powers to the regulator to recapitalize the
bank by writing down the claims of creditors, while in the case of contingent
convertible bonds, these claims can be converted to equity. This is instead of
taxpayers providing a bail-out.6 By shifting losses to creditors, and away from
taxpayers, the intention is to break the cycle of deteriorating sovereign and banking
system health.
Bail-in and contingent convertible bonds also have putative ex ante benefits –
they may increase artificially-low funding costs for systemically important banks
and thus reduce the ex ante incentives these banks enjoy. These arise because
bondholders anticipate that ‘too-big-to-fail’ banks have a lower credit risk as there
is an implicit state guarantee (Dewatripont and Freixas, 2012; Hett and Schmidt,
2014).7
Interventions are only appropriate in idiosyncratic situations (Goodhart, 2010)
as the intervention itself could ‘warn’ agents of further action. The point where the
6For a discussion of the regulatory reforms see Financial Stability Board (2014), for a review
of how countries have implemented bail-in see Financial Stability Board (2016) and for details
of the process see Zhou et al. (n.d.).
7Persaud (2014) takes a contrary view noting that, on a risk-adjusted basis, the return on
securities with bail-in characteristics is misaligned, and systemically important banks still issue
bail-in securities at artificially low yields.
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instrument converts (the ‘trigger point’) could become self-fulfilling. For example,
assuming that market capitalisation is the trigger point, a ‘death spiral’ may ensue
− as market capitalisation falls towards the trigger, there may be a discontinuous
sudden collapse (Perotti and Flannery, 2011).
The reforms also attempt to solve a political question about who bears the
burden of a bank failure, but the political dimension of ‘burden sharing’ is not
straightforward (see, for example Allen et al. (2017)). During 2016, for example,
authorities were reluctant to bail-in bondholders of Banca Monte dei Paschi di
Siena, an Italian bank. This was in part because the bondholders were large
pension funds, and politically it was difficult to impose losses on a politically
powerful constituency.
4.3.2 The African Bank case
Growth phase: 2008 to 2013
African Bank Investments Limited, a holding company, had three main subsidiaries
– a furniture retailer (Ellerines) that it purchased in 2008, a consumer credit
insurer (Stangen), and a bank. This bank, African Bank, was a monoline lender,
lending almost exclusively to low-income earners on an unsecured basis. Despite
its banking licence, the bank had historically not taken significant retail deposits,
rather relying on wholesale funding, primarily from bondholders, including pension
and mutual funds.
From 2008, the group grew rapidly, supported by cross-selling of products and
services between the different parts of the group. It was evident, however, that
the furniture subsidiary had been bought at an inflated valuation.8 A series of
writedowns reduced its value significantly. Before being bought, it had also sold
furniture for cash or on hire-purchase. The shift to unsecured lending caused an
increase in defaults.9
8The official report on the failure, Myburgh (2016), details multiple problems at the furniture
subsidiary which appeared to be unknown to African Bank, including poor credit controls and
poor governance.
9Previously, lending to Ellerines customers was on a hire-purchase collateralised basis, with
the right to repossess furniture. This was changed to unsecured lending in Ellerines stores which
could be used for furniture. Unsecured loans came with credit insurance provided by Stangen,
but with extensive exclusions. In addition, personal unsecured loans were provided direct to
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Despite these challenges, lending growth continued. By 2011, the growth in its
unsecured lending book was over 50 per cent per year, in marked contrast to the
industry average of 10 per cent. African Bank had exposure to low-income em-
ployees across all sectors, including mining. During 2012 a sustained mining strike,
including violence in the platinum mining industry, created substantial financial
distress amongst borrowers. The majority of loans written in the fourth quarter of
2012, which followed these severe problems in the mining sector, ultimately turned
bad.
Bank deteriorates: Late 2013
The funding structure was short-term and mainly wholesale, increasing funding
risk. African Bank had the highest concentration of liabilities to domestic ‘other
financial intermediaries’ (67.4 per cent), i.e. mutual funds, pension funds and
other non-bank intermediaries (see Table 4.1). Moreover, African Bank had a
substantially high exposure to foreign-currency funding (25.4 per cent of liabilities),
in marked contrast to other banks, where the average bank’s exposure varied
between 5 and 10 per cent.
Table 4.1: Liability holders: African Bank, 30 June 2014
Type of fund Holding (ZARbn) Share*
Domestic money-market funds 2.9 6.9%
Other mutual funds and pension funds 28.4 67.4%
Foreign funds 10.7 25.4%
Retail depositors 0.1 0.3%
Total 42.1 100.0%
* Share of African Bank liabilities
Source: Own calculations based on regulatory and industry data sets, ABIL
data and Sewell and Woodrow (2014) (see discussion below).
In November 2013, African Bank Investments Ltd announced that its business
had deteriorated substantially, with headline earnings falling 88 per cent and credit
customers through a branch network and in Ellerines stores.
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impairments rising to R8.27 billion, about 20 per cent of its balance sheet. It
argued a recapitalisation would place the business on a sound footing. Accordingly,
the company managed to launch a rights issue for 685.3 million new ordinary
shares, priced at 800 cents a share. This was a discount of 38.7 per cent to the
theoretical price.
The recapitalisation did not assuage the fears of bondholders. A slow run, or
‘walk’ of wholesale funders began. Total liabilities declined by R8 billion, from
R59 billion to R51 billion, over the course of six months. The decline in liabilities
was indeed only rand liabilities, which fell from R46 billion to R36 billion during
the period, with foreign currency liabilities rising by R2 billion. There was a ‘flight
from maturity’ (Gorton et al., 2014). Short-term liabilities rose from 10 to 14 per
cent of total overall liabilities over the space of a year. The yield on short-term
instruments rose. Some money-market funds pre-emptively reduced exposure to
the bank. However, the increased yield on, and greater issuance of, short-term
debt encouraged less conservative money-market funds to increase exposure.
Credit impairments continued to rise. For the bank, non-performing loans
(NPLs) rose to to 31.7 per cent of gross loans in March 2014, from 28.2 per cent
as of September 2013. For the comparative period, provisions for credit losses
increased to 26.3 per cent of average gross loans, from to 15.5 per cent. Moody’s
Investment Service reduced the group’s rating to sub-investment grade on May 30,
2014. Offshore funds which had mandates linked to the ratings were forced to sell
African Bank debt instruments, and yields on African Bank debt nearly doubled,
rising by approximately 300 to 400 basis points.
4.4 The event: bail-in of creditors
On the evening of Wednesday, August 6, 2014, African Bank issued a profit
warning. To maintain both regulatory requirements and solvency, it indicated
it needed a R8 billion recapitalisation, which would also be through a rights issue
as in the previous year. The impact was immediate. The share price slid from
500c to 35c per share over twenty-four hours and some of the international bond
prices fell as far as 50 per cent of par. By the close of trade that week, the share
price was nearly zero.
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On Sunday, August 10, 2014, the weekend following the profit warning, the
bank was placed under curatorship (statutory management), and the bail-in of
creditors was announced. The components of the write-down announcement in-
cluded the following elements: The bank would be split into a ‘good bank’ and a
‘bad / residual bank’. Reasonably well-performing loans would be transferred to
the good bank, while the remaining non-performing loans would remain behind in
the residual bank, which would be gradually wound down. The claims of senior
unsecured bondholders were separated out into two: A claim in the ‘good bank’, at
90 per cent of the face value of their instruments and a ‘stub’ claim in the ‘residual
bank’ of 10 per cent of the value of their instruments. The understanding was that
the claim in the residual bank was essentially worthless. This had the same effect
as an enforced ‘bail-in’, in that bondholders had little choice but to accept potential
losses in order to achieve the resolution of the bank. (However, this meant that it
was not a true bail-in. Bondholders retained a residual debt claim.) Subordinated
creditors initially lost their entire holdings. Subsequently, a compromise between
senior, subordinated creditors and the Reserve Bank was reached, and it was agreed
that subordinated creditors would be transferred to the good bank at 37.5 per cent
of their holdings. (Subsequent announcements also clarified that interest would
accrue, and that maturities would be extended.) To forestall a potential freeze
in money-market instruments, on the morning following the resolution, the large
banks offered unlimited buy-back for overnight instruments they had issued. This
promise was backed up by the standing liquidity facility from the central bank.
4.4.1 Money-market funds ‘break the buck’
Before the market opened on Monday, August 11 2014, the regulator instructed
money-market funds with African Bank exposure to reprice this exposure and take
into account the 10% haircut. The effect was a negative impact on the value of all
exposed money-market funds.
Exposed money-market funds ‘broke the buck’, i.e. registered capital losses.
But the ‘breaking of the buck’ was purely mechanical and an outcome of the
regulatory formula and the haircut, and not due to sudden large redemptions. In
terms of the relevant regulation (Board Notice 90, paragraph 7), ‘a reduction in
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value occurs where a loss of a sale or a default of a money-market instrument
results in a loss greater than the income accrued in the portfolio in an accounting
period’ (Financial Services Board, 2014). The accounting period under the law is
one day.
The full write-down of 10 per cent of the value of African Bank instruments
was thus offset first against the daily yield of the money-market fund and, if that
was not sufficient, then the capital was reduced. It was essentially treated as a
‘negative yield’.10 The bail-in imposed on funds was larger than the daily yields.
Thus it was inevitable that all funds with any African Bank exposure had a capital
write-down. We show below that the large redemptions did not cause the breaking
of the buck. Rather, the redemptions accelerated after the breaking of the buck.
Moreover, to forestall an uninformed run, funds with exposure in African Bank
were given the option to transfer holdings to separate retention funds, with the ef-
fect of creating a type of discretionary liquidity restriction.11 This ostensibly made
the valuation of the money-market fund transparent and immediate; reducing the
likelihood of a run, and reducing ‘first-mover advantage’. The reorganisation took
place before the market opened. Only four money-market funds chose to use
retention funds, while nine did not; and one chose sponsor support.
Release of information on exposures
Money-market funds voluntarily regularly release ‘fact sheets’ containing a sum-
mary of the largest holdings of the fund, typically the ten largest exposures. These
are available to investors, and are also collated by third-party information services,
e.g. Morningstar. A review of the fact sheets shows that African Bank did not
qualify as a ‘top-ten exposure’ for any fund. Up to the bail-in event, it is unlikely
that retail investors knew what the extent of holdings were. More sophisticated
investors may have had more information, partly through ongoing interaction with
10A detailed breakdown of each fund’s approach to the event is provided at https://www.
psg.co.za/wealth/funds_impacted_by_abil, with worked calculation examples.
11During periods of distress, first-movers benefit from being able to access the liquid assets
first, known as ‘sequential service’ Goldstein et al. (2016). This leaves an ever-diminishing
pool of assets for investors who act later. To forestall the potential run, discretionary liquidity
restrictions stop early movers from withdrawing their entire investment. For a discussion of the
use of these restrictions following the global financial crisis see Aiken et al. (2015).
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the fund managers. However, it is unlikely that they had detailed information.12
On the Monday morning following the bail-in, however, the information set
available changed significantly. All funds were forced to both announce their expo-
sure to African Bank, and announce the impact on the fund. Funds communicated
this via text message or e-mail to their clients early on Monday.
4.5 Data
Two mutual fund data sets were compiled for the empirical analysis – an extensive
quarterly mutual fund data set (‘Quarterly data set’ ) and a more limited daily
mutual fund data set (‘Daily data set’ ).
The focus here is on interest-bearing mutual funds, particularly money-market
funds and short-term ‘income’ funds. Money-market funds13 are the largest interest-
bearing type of fund, with assets under management of approximately R267 billion
in March 2016, or 10.7 per cent of GDP. These funds must maintain a constant
net asset value (NAV) of 1; and may only invest in money-market instruments
with a residual maturity of less than 13 months, a weighted average duration of
90 days, and a weighted average remaining life of 120 days. Income funds (‘short-
term interest-bearing’) funds do not maintain a constant NAV, and may invest
in longer-dated instruments, but in other respects are most like money-market
funds.14
4.5.1 Quarterly data
The quarterly data set contains consistent data for all money-market and income
funds from March 2013 to March 2015. The data was collated from quarterly
mutual fund reports published by the Association of Savings and Investment South
12This was confirmed through interviews with large institutional investors.
13Money-market funds are regulated under Board Notice 90 of the Collective Investment
Schemes Control Act (2002). The regulatory framework is similar to that of the relevant Securities
and Exchanges Commission requirement (rule 2a-7) requirements for money-market funds and
the European Union UCITs standards.
14The classification scheme follows the industry association’s fund classification scheme,
available at http://www.asisa.org.za
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Africa.15 All registered mutual funds submit data on a prescribed template to the
Association, which publishes the data on a regular and consistent basis.
The data set has 19,314 data points. There is sufficient data on 74 interest-
bearing mutual funds, of which 37 are money-market funds and 37 are income
funds. There are 29 fields of information per fund (individual-specific, time vari-
ant). This includes information on the aggregated portfolio allocation of each
fund by type of financial instrument and by maturity. Financial instruments are
categorised and aggregated into nine categories, viz. instruments issued by gov-
ernment, other public entities, non-financial corporations, financial corporations,
cash instruments, derivatives instruments, and listed and unlisted money-market
instruments.
Eight maturity buckets are reported (overnight, 0-3, 3-6, 6-12 months, and
1-3, 3-7, 7-12 and more than 12 years). The source of funds is either retail or
institutional. The former is defined as natural persons, whereas the latter is non-
natural persons and can include institutional investors such as pension funds and
life companies, large corporations or other funds.16 There is also information on
average balances, and the number of accounts.
Table 4.2 reports summary statistics for June 2014, shortly before the cura-
torship announcement. The data summarises the data into constant NAV money-
market funds and variable NAV income funds. It also provides details on average
returns and portfolio allocation across the different types of funds. These differ-
ences are discussed in more detail below.
15See https://www.asisa.org.za/statistics/.
16Large and sophisticated corporations typically hold operational balances in overnight money-
market funds.
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4.5.2 Daily data set
The second data set contains daily data on money-market funds and income funds.
It is collated from daily reports by Profile Data17 and cross-checked against infor-
mation from Morningstar,18 two third-party providers of mutual fund information.
A daily data set is available on fund size, most recent return,19 total expense ratio,
transaction cost and total investment cost.20
The daily set contains a subset of large funds. Summary statistics are reported
in Table 4.3. There are a total of 103,000 data points, made up of 515 days of
data beginning from before the event until two years after the event; and 50 funds,
with four fields of fund-specific, time-variant information per fund. For money-
market funds, the daily data set contains 17 funds compared to the 37 funds in
the quarterly data set. At September 2014, the total money-market fund holdings
in the daily set amounted to R163.5 billion, compared to the total assets of the
funds in the quarterly data set of R241.5 billion. Put another way, the daily set
contains 46 per cent of the funds by number and 68 per cent by value. Returns
are calculated as the annualised monthly yield on the fund (distributions as a
percentage of the fund).
For income funds, the daily set contains 33 funds, compared to 37 funds in
the quarterly data set. The daily data has 89 per cent by number and 65 per
cent by value. For income funds, returns are calculated in two ways. The first is
the annual income and capital gains distributions, which are slightly misleadingly
termed dividends. These are expressed as a percentage of the fund. The second is
the change in the NAV. The fund-level return and TER data are matched to the
quarterly data set.
The significant difference between the two data sets is that the daily set only has
information on NAVs, returns and costs, whereas the quarterly set has extensive
information on holdings.
17http://www.profile.co.za
18http://www.morningstar.co.za
19Measured as the annualised interest and dividend yield paid to investors.
20The total expense ratio is an industry-wide measure of the cost of administering the portfolio
relative to the NAV, transaction costs related to the costs of buying or selling the fund, and total
investment cost is an aggregate of the two measures.
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4.5.3 Supplementary financial instrument level data
Additional data was obtained from the regulator of mutual funds and merged with
the main quarterly data set. This data set is a limited subset of 35 large income and
money-market funds at two dates, end of June 2014 and end of September 2014.
The data capture approximately 20 per cent of the money market and income
funds by value, and 45 per cent by number. The data provide the exposure of
these funds to 2,422 financial instruments, issued by 206 issuers at the end of June
2014 and the end of September 2014. Each instrument code provides information
on maturity date and average interest rate.
For the purposes of the analysis, I classified each of the 2,422 financial in-
struments following an approach matching the quarterly data set. However, the
more granular information allows for additional subcategories. For the issuer
information, the data set adds large bank, mid-tier bank, small bank, central
government, and public entity. For the maturity information it adds term to
maturity, which is not in the industry data set.
Additional data was obtained from the South African Reserve Bank, both from
the Bank Supervision Department which publishes data on liabilities of supervised
banks; annual reports and trading updates from African Bank Investment Ltd
and African Bank Ltd.21 This data was complemented with data published by
the funds themselves, including fund ‘fact sheets’ − however, these sheets do not
always contain detailed information on fund holdings.22
4.5.4 Exposure to African Bank
The estimate of exposure to African Bank was obtained in two ways. The first way
was an analysis of the regulatory returns, which provide a detailed picture of the
exposure of each fund to different instruments. The second was to calculate the
exposure by considering the size of the retention funds set up by each fund. The
two ways yield broadly comparable results − however, due to inconsistencies in
21http://africanbank.investoreports.com/ and from the Treasury division of the bank.
22See, for example, the June 2014 Stanlib statement which does not disclose the African Bank
holdings, despite the fact that it was a larger proportion of its holdings than other holdings,
which were disclosed.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
102 Chapter 4. African Bank and the money-market run of 2014
Table 4.4: Summary statistics, financial-instrument level data
Category Number Mean Days-to Coupon
Issuers Instruments Jun-14 Sep-14 Maturity %
Large Bank 4 787 31,762 28,784 197 8.2%
Mid-tier bank 3 120 11,060 14,124 30 5.8%
African Bank 1 53 18,260 457 53 7.8%
State-owned entities 23 192 46,366 41,958 96 8.9%
Sovereign 1 115 40,5068 60,074 115 6.0%
Derivatives 16 270 9,220 8,149 269 6.3%
Non-bank 157 881 15,028 14,892 881 8.2%
205 2418 24,601 24,063 234 7.3%
Source: Quarterly data set (see text)
the way funds report to the regulator, the second approach was preferred. Where
funds did not set up retention funds, the first approach was used.
4.5.5 Data cleaning and reconciliation
Two adjustments had to be made to the data: retention funds and double-counting.
Some funds created retention funds at the time of the failure. These retention funds
caused an automatic reduction in the size of the fund, as the assets were held in a
separate fund. The effect is to overstate the reduction in the size of the fund. The
second concern is double-counting – money-market funds by definition buy high-
yield short-term instruments. These are sometimes simply units23 in other money-
market funds. This is most notable for yield-chasing funds of funds, typically
actively managed funds that merely aim to keep a portfolio of, for example, the
ten highest yielding money-market funds. As far as possible, data without double-
counting was used.
23A ‘unit’ is an holding in a collective investment scheme or a money-market fund, similar to
a ‘share’ in a company. (Originally these were ‘unit trusts’, i.e. trusts that had been unitised).
In the case of a money-market fund, a unit maintains its value at 1.
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4.5.6 Were funds with African Bank exposure different ex
ante?
Table 4.2 presents summary statistics of interest-bearing funds grouped by type
(money-market or income) and exposure to African Bank on 30 June 2014, prior
to the event.
On average, money-market funds with African Bank exposure were larger than
funds without exposure. The 14 money-market funds with exposure had an average
net asset value of R 15.9 billion, compared to the 23 without exposure of R 3.1
billion.
Returns, however, were larger in non-exposed money-market funds (see Table
4.3). Non-exposed money-market funds had an annual yield (weighted by fund
size) of 5.23 per cent, compared to a yield of 5.11 per cent for exposed funds, and
a yield of 5.18 per cent for all funds.24
A further measure of the riskiness of the portfolios is in the holdings of under-
lying instruments. Table 4.2 presents both instruments and maturities using the
quarterly data set.
The high exposure to financial corporations is evident. Money-market funds, in
particular, show very high exposure to financial corporations. Average exposure of
money-market funds to financial corporations was 95.1 per cent, mainly deposits
(35.9 per cent), debt instruments (31.0 per cent), and unlisted instruments (28.2
per cent). All exposures to African Bank amounted to 1.1 per cent.
4.6 Results
4.6.1 The impact on money-market funds
In this section, the impact on mutual funds following the bail-in is analysed. From
a simple examination of the daily data (see Figure 4.1), it is immediately apparent
that there were large-scale redemptions of investments in money-market funds.
On average, African Bank made up approximately 1.1 per cent of the holdings
24This yield may appear high – however the corresponding inflation rate for the period was
6.59 per cent.
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Figure 4.1: Cumulative money-market fund redemptions
Redemptions were concentrated in money-market funds with African Bank exposure.
Redemptions began shortly after the adverse profitability announcement, and accelerated after
the bail-in and Moody’s downgrade.
of money-market funds. Within three weeks, money-market fund redemptions
reached R32.4 billion, or 11.8 per cent of the size of all money-market funds. The
redemptions were concentrated in money-market funds with exposure to African
Bank, where clients redeemed 15 per cent of their holdings. The profitability signal
precipitated the beginning of redemptions. Once the bail-in was announced two
days later, redemptions accelerated. They continued as Moody’s downgraded the
credit rating of the bank on Wednesday, August 13, the second time in a year.
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4.6.2 Redemptions controlling for fund heterogeneity
It is possible that the large observed money-market and income fund redemptions
may reflect other differences between the funds, and not be directly attributable
to exposure to African Bank. The related literature showed that overall riskiness,
maturity structure and nature of investors (uninformed or informed) may influence
redemptions following a shock. Funds with a variable NAV, for example, are
theoretically more robust in the face of shocks.
There is sufficient data in the quarterly data set to control for the observed het-
erogeneity between mutual funds, in terms of size, investment strategy, holdings,
maturity structure, and variable NAV versus constant NAV.
For the first analysis, I use a full sample of 74 mutual funds, with equal time
periods before and after the event. Both money-market and income funds are
included, and in subsequent sections the behaviour of these two kinds of funds will
be analysed separately.
The first model specification is:
∆LogFundSizet = β0 + β1Xt,j + β2Tt,j (4.1)
where ∆LogFundSizet, is the one period change in the log fund size, Xt,j
is a vector of mutual fund characteristics j at time t, and Tt,j is a vector of
treatment dummies that evaluate the statistical significance of various treatments.
It is widely documented25 that fund flows are determined by returns. That is,
funds with higher returns experience greater inflows all other things being equal.
Using fund returns directly is problematic, however. Fund returns are likely to be
confounded with exposure to African Bank, in particular as the return on African
Bank instruments was higher than other instruments. For this reason, I proxy fund
returns using maturity and types of exposure to instruments. Two maturity mea-
sures are included: a measure of the share of short-dated instruments (ShareShort),
which is a proxy of the portfolio allocation to instruments of duration less than
6 months) and the change in maturity (∆ Maturity). I also include the share of
exposure to government bonds (ShareGovi) and in an alternative specification add
25See, for example, the discussion in Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2013) or Cici et al. (2017)
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in a measure of the share of assets in cash instruments (ShareCash).
The treatment effects take the form of three dummy variables: BailIn tests for
the effect of the bail-in, and takes the value of 0 for the period before the bail-in and
1 for the periods after. AfricanBank takes the value of 1 for funds with exposure
to African Bank.26 MMF takes the value of 1 if the fund is a money-market fund.
Results
Table 4.5 presents the results of an analysis using panel treatment effects. The
results confirm the initial analysis presented in Figure 4.1.
In specification (1), the coefficient on short-dated maturity is positive, suggest-
ing that funds with relatively higher shares of assets in short-dated instruments
experience larger flows on average. Similarly, the change in maturity is also
positive. This may reflect the corollary of Gorton et al. (2014)’s ‘flight from
maturity’ effect – as funds grow, their maturity lengthens.
The treatment dummies are also of the expected size and effect. The African
Bank measure is positive and statistically significant – as observed in Table 4.2,
typically larger funds had exposure to African Bank.
Most notably, the triple interaction term for bail-in, African Bank and money-
market fund is negative and statistically significant. This supports the hypothesis
that money-market funds with African Bank exposure experienced larger outflows
following the shock, even after controlling for other fund characteristics. It does not
necessarily follow that income funds were completely unaffected – I will examine
this question in more detail below. Interestingly, the dummies for bail-in and
money-market funds are individually not statistically significant in this specifica-
tion, but become so in specification (4) discussed below. This is consistent with the
observed flows – only African Bank-exposed funds experienced large redemptions.
Robustness and econometric tests
In specification (1), the analysis considered the change in the size of the fund.
However, at the time of the bail-in, funds could elect to transfer their African
26Due to multi-collinearity in the final regressions, an alternative of share of African Bank
exposure was also used.
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Table 4.5: Did exposure to African Bank determine redemptions?
Dependent variable:
∆ Log Fund Size ∆ Log Fund Size (Adj.)a
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share: short maturity (<6mth)) 2.051∗∗∗ 2.052∗∗∗ 2.087∗∗∗ 2.040∗∗∗
(0.463) (0.464) (0.468) (0.201)
∆ Maturity 0.171∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.013)
Share: Cash −0.498∗
(0.270)
Dummy: Bail-in 0.073 0.074 0.085 0.083
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.203)
Dummy: African Bankb 0.275 0.271 0.274 0.249∗
(0.226) (0.226) (0.223) (0.133)
Dummy: MMFb −0.00004 −0.00004 −0.00005 −0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Dummy: Bail-in x Afr Bank −0.069∗ −0.065∗ −0.071∗∗ −0.160∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.049)
Dummy: Bail-in x MMF −0.208 −0.209 −0.226 −0.206
(0.172) (0.172) (0.176) (0.302)
Dummy: Afr Bank x MMF −0.376 −0.378 −0.404∗ −0.353
(0.233) (0.233) (0.231) (0.392)
Dummy: Bail-in x Afr Bank x MMF −0.670∗∗ −0.670∗∗ −0.775∗∗∗ −0.732∗
(0.266) (0.266) (0.274) (0.405)
Fixed effects: fd=Fund fd=Fund fd=Fund fd=Fund
Observations 507 507 500 469
R2 0.273 0.273 0.280 0.306
Adjusted R2 0.261 0.261 0.268 0.292
F Statistic 21.920∗∗∗ 21.890∗∗∗ 22.343∗∗∗ 21.245∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
This table presents the results of panel fixed effects (first difference) regressions. The dependent
variable is the one-period change in the log size of mutual funds.
† Adjusted for retention funds. Retention funds are added back to the original fund.
‡ Instrumental variables - for money-market fund: exposure to instruments over 1 year, and for
African Bank exposure: share of African Bank exposure.
 As noted in Table 4.7, the null of serial correlation in residuals cannot be rejected for specifications
(1), (2) and (3). Robust standard errors are adjusted following MacKinnon and White (1985);
Arellano (1987).
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Table 4.6: Concentration of holdings
Exposure % of fund % of all MMF
ABSA money-market fund R 1 677 m 3.3% 56.9%
Stanlib money-market funds R650 m 2.6% 17.3%
Investec money-market fund R270 m 1.0% 9.2%
Momentum money-market fund R95 m 1.1% 3.2%
Other (9 funds) R254 m 8.6%
Total R2 945 m 1.00% 100%
Source: as above, and fund fact sheets
Bank exposures to a retention fund. Only a limited number of funds elected to
transfer, but it is possible that the transfer may bias the results by overstating
the size of the redemptions in the fund. For this reason, in specifications (2), (3)
and (4), the dependent variable is the size of the fund adjusted for retention funds.
The effect on the estimated co-efficients is small. Notably the estimated coefficient
on the triple interaction term is unchanged at three decimal places.
The second concern is the observed concentration of holdings (Table 4.6). The
ABSA money-market fund, South Africa’s largest, accounted for 57 per cent of
all money-market fund exposures to African Bank, or R1.677 billion. This may
appear large, but the ABSA money-market fund was valued at R51.1 billion in
early 2014, and so the African Bank holdings account for only 3.3 per cent of the
fund. Together 91.4 per cent of money-market fund exposures were concentrated
in five money-market funds.
To test whether or not there is an impact, in specification (3) I exclude the
largest fund from the data sample. The results suggest that the single fund does
not drive the results, but there are some changes to the magnitude of the result.
Interestingly, the coefficent on the triple interaction term becomes more negative.
This suggests that excluding the largest fund does change the results, albeit not
substantially.
The largest fund is also relatively unique in that it is almost entirely (99 per
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cent) invested in cash instruments.27 This is in marked contrast to other MMFs,
which maintain approximately 11 per cent in overnight cash-type instruments.
This may further bias the results. To take this into account, in specification (4),
the regression excludes the largest fund, and includes a measure of the share of
cash (ShareCash).28
In specification (4), the double interaction term of bail-in and African Bank
becomes more negative and statistically significant. This may suggest that all
mutual funds with African Bank exposure experienced some outflows. However,
the triple interaction term remains negative and significant, indicating that money-
market funds still experienced larger outflows.
Panel econometric tests
I test for variable stationarity to ensure that panel co-integration effects are not
present. The dependent variable, ∆LogFundSizet, is found to be stationary. The
statistical tests reject the null of a unit root.
Table 4.7: Panel econometric tests
Dependent variable:
∆ Log Fund Size ∆ Log Fund Size (Adj.)†
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hausman test p<2.2e-16 p<2.2e-16 p<2.2e-16 p<2.2e-16
F test p = 0.1513 p = 0.4875 p = 0.2573 p = 0.1808
Breusch-Godfrey
Wooldridge
χ2 8.9376 8.9359 9.1512 5.3522
p=0.01146 p=0.01147 p=0.0103 p=0.06883
27Its African Bank holdings were also in overnight negotiable certificates of deposit, which are
classified as cash for the purposes of the statistics, and were also bailed in.
28For brevity, full econometric tests are not reported here. Tests were conducted to evaluate
whether there are unidentified fund-specific characteristics, and these indicated that a fixed-
effects panel is appropriate. The nature of the specification is first differences, due to the
presence of serial correlation effects as borne out by a Wooldridge test. The existence of potential
cointegration effects is reduced by the specification method. That said, we find no evidence of a
unit root in the dependent variable.
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I conduct a number of tests on the specification, reported in Table 4.7.
The first test considered is the Hausman phtest, which tests for the presence of
fixed effects. Fixed effects are essentially group dummies, where particular groups
of observations may have a different intercepts. In this case, there is an a priori
case that each fund should have a set of unobservable characteristics. The null
is that there are no fixed effects (i.e. that there are random effects), with the
alternative hypothesis of fixed effects. This test compares the unique errors (ui)
are correlated with the regressors. For each specification reported in Table 4.5, a
random effects version of the model was run, and compared to the reported fixed
effects model. Across all cases, the Hausman test p-value is reported as below
0.01, indicating that the null of random effects should be rejected. A related test
is an F test for time effects, estimated using the pFtest function. In this case, the
null is that there are no time fixed effects needed. The reported p-values indicate
that the null should not be rejected, indicating that one can proceed without time
effects (Torres-Reyna, 2010, 18).
A more serious concern is the results of the Breusch-Godfrey/Wooldridge test,
where the null hypothesis is no serial correlation in the idiosyncratic errors (pbgtest).
This may bias the standard errors. The null is rejected for specifications (1), (2),
and (3), suggesting the presence of possible serial correlation. As a result, new
robust standard errors are calculated, following MacKinnon and White (1985);
Arellano (1987). Table 4.5 contains the robust standard errors. For specification
(4), the null is not rejected at the 5 per cent confidence level. Consequently, I do
not adjust the standard errors.
4.6.3 How did money-market funds respond to the event?
Daily redemption patterns - money-market funds and other funds
In the week after the bail-in announcement, total money-market fund redemptions
were 6.7 per cent, whereas money-market funds with African Bank exposure had
redemptions of 8 per cent and those without exposure actually saw small inflows.
Within a month, redemptions in African Bank-exposed funds reached nearly 15
per cent. If we express the redemptions in absolute terms, there was a total outflow
from money-market funds of R 32.4 billion, and assets under management fell from
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R 271.3 billion to R 241.5 billion, or approximately 11.8 per cent.
By 30 September 2014, the end of the reporting quarter, total redemptions from
money-market funds were R32.4 billion, with assets under management falling
from R 271.3 billion to R 241.5 billion, or approximately 11.8 per cent of the
industry. We can estimate where the money went by looking at the monthly
banking statistics.29 It appears that institutional investors moved money to banks,
with the deposits in banks from these investors rising to R24 billion from R16
billion, an increase of R8 billion, or 50 per cent. There were inflows into banks
from households and pension funds, although smaller. In addition, flows to equity
funds and multi-asset funds also rose.
If one considers that the outflow was approximately 11 times the size of the
entire money-market fund exposure to African Bank, it is clear that there was a
significant flow.
Table 4.8 presents an analysis of the behavior of different money-market funds
controlling for fund and investor characteristics. This gives an indication how
different characteristics affected fund flows differently. Of the outflow, the majority
was due to institutional investors (outflows of R23.3 billion) compared to retail
investors (R9.1 billion). Moreover, investors acted (relatively) rationally. The 14
portfolios with exposure to African Bank were most affected − losing R30 billion;
whereas the 29 portfolios with no African Bank exposure only lost R2.1 billion.
Here institutional investors also responded as expected indicating some knowledge
− they withdrew very little from funds with no African Bank exposure. This
suggests that improved information had a substantial (and expected) result on
run behaviour. Fourteen funds with African Bank exposure experienced outflows.
These outflows also averaged 11x the size of the African Bank exposure. The
largest outflow from one fund was 24x the exposure to African Bank; and the
smallest was 2x the exposure.
These results could be explained in part by a somewhat unintended consequence
of the retention funds. Creating the retention fund immediately highlighted that
the relevant fund had exposure to African Bank − possibly this explains why so
few money-market funds actually used retention funds. Nevertheless, the four
funds that chose to use retention funds had R21.9 billion in outflows; equivalent
29Obtained from the Bank Supervision Department of the South African Reserve Bank.
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Table 4.8: Which types of money-market funds saw inflows and
outflows?
Controlling for: n Inflow + / Outflow - Flow as % of fund
No control (all funds) 37 - R32.8 billion -12.6%
Portfolios experienced outflows 21 - R37.4 billion -14.4%
Portfolios experienced inflows 16 + R4.7 billion 1.8%
Investor type
Institutional investor 37 - R23.3 billion -9.0%
Retail investor 37 - R9.1 billion -3.6%
Exposure to African Bank
Exposed 14 - R30.1 billion -11.6%
Not exposed 23 - R2.7 billion -1.0%
Exposure to ABL & Investor
Institutional | ABL 14 - R22.2 billion -8.6%
Institutional | No ABL 23 - R1.1 billion -0.4%
Retail | ABL 14 - R7.5 billion -3.0%
Retail | No ABL 23 - R1.6 billion -0.6%
Retention fund
Retention fund / sponsor support 4 - R21.9 billion -8.4%
No retention fund 33 - R8.2 billion -4.2%
Source: Industry data set (see text).
to 9x their holdings in African Bank. In contrast the 9 funds that chose not
to experienced R8.2 billion in outflows, equivalent to 16.6x their African Bank
holdings.
4.6.4 How did income funds respond to the event?
Income funds experienced the African Bank episode very differently from money-
market funds. I disaggregate changes in income funds into two effects. The first
effect is the price effect, i.e. changes to the NAV of income funds. The second
effect is the redemption effect, i.e. changes to income funds due to withdrawals. I
consider both effects below.
Impact on income-fund NAVs
To better understand the impact on NAVs, Figure 4.2 presents the income fund
NAVs over the course of the bail-in episode. The figure shows that income fund
NAVs adjusted downwards ahead of the bail-in event. This was because income
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Figure 4.2: Income fund NAVs
Revaluation effects led to NAVs falling for African Bank-exposed income funds. NAVs fell
during the week prior to the bail-in as bond prices fell, and then recovered as the value of
other instruments in the portfolio improved.
funds registered losses as the mark-to-market price of African Bank instruments
deteriorated.
However, the NAVs of non-exposed funds also fell. This suggests there may be
broader confounding market-wide effects unrelated to African Bank. To test this,
I use an adapted version of the standard Fama-Macbeth model to calculate the
deviation of returns for exposed and unexposed funds relative to all income funds.
Rit −Rft = ai + βi(RMt −Rft) + eit (4.2)
In this regression, Rit is the daily return (including changes to NAV) on fund
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i for day t, Rft is the riskfree rate (the overnight South African Treasury rate),
RMt is the the return on all income funds, ai is the average return left unexplained
by the benchmark model (the estimate of αi), and eit is the regression residual.
We can compare the estimate of ai for income funds with African Bank exposure
to that of income funds without exposure. The estimate (see Table 4.9) is that
return for income funds with African Bank exposure relative to the benchmark
was -0.5974, with a standard error of 0.1356. For income funds without exposure,
the estimate is 0.212 with a standard error of 0.098. This shows a significant
underperformance for African Bank income funds over the period.
Table 4.9: Fama-Macbeth results
Dependent variable:
Income fund: Income fund:
African Bank no African Bank
exposure exposure
(1) (2)
β 0.722∗∗ 0.654∗∗∗
(0.286) (0.206)
α −0.597∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗
(0.136) (0.098)
Observations 21 21
R2 0.251 0.347
Adjusted R2 0.212 0.312
Residual Std. Error (df = 19) 0.372 0.268
F Statistic (df = 1; 19) 6.367∗∗ 10.076∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Impact on income-fund redemptions
There is evidence that income funds also experienced redemptions during the
period. The econometric results presented in Table 4.5 indicate that income funds
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Figure 4.3: Redemptions in exposed money-market funds compared to income
funds
Affected money-market funds experienced large and statistically significant outflows. While there
were outflows in affected income funds, these are not found to be statistically significant. For
the relevant ANOVA tests, see Table 4.10
were, however, less affected by the shock than money-market funds. A variety of
techniques were used to test for whether or not there is a statistically significant
outflow. Limited indications of an impact are found, partly evidenced by the
box-and-whisker plots presented in Figure 4.3, and confirmed with the ANOVA
tests presented in Table 4.10. The ANOVA test presents the null hypothesis of no
statistical difference in flows. For money-market funds, the null is rejected at a 5
per cent confidence level. In contrast, for income funds, the null is not rejected.
4.6.5 Portfolio reallocation and spillover effects
The previous section analysed how investors into mutual funds behaved, noting
that there were significant redemptions. But how did the funds respond - i.e. what
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Table 4.10: ANOVA test for exposed money-market and income funds
Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value Pr(>F)
MMF - with ABL exposure 1 0.02 0.02 4.02 0.0487*
Residuals 71 0.35 0.00
Income fund - with ABL exposure 1 0.01 0.01 1.44 0.2341
Residuals 71 0.36 0.01
did asset managers do? Significant portfolio rebalancing could trigger spillovers,
particularly if the rebalancing precipitated large-scale sales of financial instruments
in other banks.
The connection between non-bank financial institutions, such as mutual funds
and pension funds, and banks is particularly close in South Africa − in 2013,
approximately 33.6 per cent of bank liabilities were to these other financial in-
termediaries; in contrast the global average was 4.9 per cent in the same year.30
By March 2016, the South African mutual fund industry had approximately R1.7
trillion of assets under management, or 68 per cent of nominal gross domestic
product (GDP). As a comparator, retail bank deposits were approximately R912.5
billion, or 36 per cent of GDP.
The size of the mutual funds potentially magnifies the potential for spillovers
and arises through the channels discussed above – common exposures, hoarding, a
cascade of defaults or through opaque interlinkages between money-market funds
and banks.
At aggregate level
The industry data set shows evidence of rebalancing of holdings in financial in-
stitutions. Income funds (see Table 4.11) reduce their exposure by 12.9 per cent.
Money-market funds increase their exposure to financial institutions, by 2 per cent.
A related effect is a change in maturities. Table 4.12 shows the allocation across
different maturities for money-market funds. There was a marked fall in allocation
to cash, from R27.3 billion to R18.7 billion. This may reflect the need to fund the
30Statistics in this section are from Financial Stability Board (2015) and the industry data
set.
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Table 4.11: Mutual fund exposure to financial institutions
Type of fund June Sept % change
Income funds 57.8 50.3 -12.9%
Money-market funds 72.0 73.4 2.0%
All funds 129.8 123.8 -4.6%
Note: Aggregate holdings of instruments issued by
‘financial institutions’.
large redemption requirements that came through. However, there was a rise in
allocations to short-term (0-3 month) instruments, typically short-term deposits.
Allocations to this category rose from R107 billion to R114 billion, or from 39.6
per cent of the portfolio to 47.6 per cent of the portfolio. But the main effect is
at the longer maturities. The allocation in the 3-6 month category fell from R72.9
billion (or 26.9 per cent) to R51.4 billion (or 21.3 per cent). Holdings longer than
six months were also reduced from R63.6 billion to R56.0 billion.
Table 4.12: Change in maturity profile,
money-market funds
June Sept
R m % R m %
Cash 27 303 10.1% 18 791 7.8%
0-3 Months 107 492 39.6% 114 919 47.6%
3-6 Months 72 891 26.9% 51 436 21.3%
> 6 Months 63 616 23.5% 56 008 23.2%
Total 271 301 100% 241 154 100%
Note: This table uses the industry data to show how
the aggregate maturity of MMFs changed from the
quarter before and after the bail-in.
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Portfolio rebalancing at a financial instrument level
The data set on allocation to financial institutions data is somewhat misleading,
as it includes insurers and other non-bank financial institutions. It may not, for
example, capture a rebalancing of the portfolios away from banks towards non-
bank financial institutions. The observed lengthening of maturities also does
not necessarily capture the nature and type of reallocations between different
types of instruments. To better understand these dynamics, the data at financial
instrument level is more appropriate.
To test the effects at a financial institutional level, banks are classified into three
categories: ‘Big Four’, which are the four largest South African banks (Barclays
Africa / ABSA, Standard, FirstRand and Nedbank); Small and mid-tier banks
(Investec, Capitec and Sasfin) and African Bank. Sovereign debt instruments are
instruments issued by the national government. Public entity debt is issued by
both sub-national sovereigns and state-owned entities (including municipalities,
large national state-owned entities and smaller regional entities, such as water
boards).
Table 4.13 summarises the results. In this sample, total mutual-fund redemp-
tions are 3.3 per cent. There are marked rebalancing effects, however, showing that
fund managers actively sought to reduce exposure to bank-issued debt, in favor of
safer sovereign-issued debt. Exposures to Big Four banks debt reduce from R24.4
billion to R22.2 billion, a decline of 9.1 per cent. This suggests significant potential
spillover effects.
Potential for a market freeze
The notable decline in exposures to large banks highlights that a key concern
during the resolution was the potential for a market freeze in short-term paper.
At end July 2014, the big four banks had 4.6 per cent of their liabilities from
mutual funds. There was a notable decline in funding from mutual funds from
R119.3 billion to R110.0 billion between end July and end August 2014, over the
period of the resolution.
This was in financial instruments with a duration of less than 30 days, typically
negotiable certificates of deposit (NCDs). Of these instruments, 36 per cent were
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Table 4.13: How did mutual funds rebalance their portfolios?
Exposure to (Rand billion) June 2014 Sept 2014 Change %
‘Big Four’ bank 24.4 22.2 -2,2 -9.1%
Small and mid-tier bank 2.0 2.1 0.8 3.9%
African Bank* 1.0 0.0 -0.9 -97.5%
Sovereign 4.7 6.9 2.2 48.3%
Public entity 7.5 6.9 -0.6 -7.5%
Derivative 2.3 2.1 -0.2 -6.8%
Non-bank corporate 13.6 13.4 -0.3 -1.9%
Total 55.5 53.7 -1.8 -3.3%
Total (ex African Bank) 54.5 53.6 -0.9 -1.6%
Almost all holdings in African Bank were restated.
This table uses the regulatory data set to identify how money-market fund
asset allocation changed over the time of the bail-in announcement. The largest
changes are highlighted in bold: a reduction in allocations to big-four banks and
an increase in allocation to risk-free and liquid sovereign paper (48% increase).
The data set is a representative sample, and is approximately 20% of the full
data set.
held by money-market funds. As highlighted above, arrangements were made to
ensure that there was no freeze in the market for these instruments.
Liquidity conditions can be proxied by short-term interest rates. In Figure 4.4,
the evolution of the spread between the central bank overnight rate and the 90-day
NCD rate is presented. There is a clear indication of some stress as rates rose.
Moreover, there were knock-on effects. In the two weeks directly after the bail-in,
three corporates cancelled bond issuances due to adverse market conditions: Real
People Investments (a small bank), Toyota and BMW (the local subsidiaries of
the automakers).
4.6.6 Long-term outcome
Ultimately, African Bank was successfully restructured. By August 2017, three
years after the bail-in, the bank had resumed profitable lending. The ‘stub’ claim,
created at the time of the bail-in, was trading at 66 per cent of par. Essentially
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Figure 4.4: Spread between bank NCD rate and overnight rate
The spread between the prevailing rate on negotiable certificates of deposits issued by banks and
the benchmark rate widened over the course of the bail-in. Interviews with market participants
reveal a substantial tightening of market conditions. Three non-bank financial institutions were
forced to cancel bond issuances, and bond issuances for banks became more expensive.
the majority of the bail-in had been recovered as the profitability of the bank
improved. The bail-in arguably provided an opportunity for the authorities to
stop the further deterioration of the bank, recapitalise it by writing off creditors’
claims, and restore its ability to undertake business.
4.7 Conclusion
Policymakers are increasingly relying on bank resolution strategies that seek to
impose losses on creditors. Using a unique event, this chapter analyses the effects
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of one such resolution on money-market funds.
The immediate result was that all affected money-market funds ‘broke the
buck’. This triggered large redemptions. Nevertheless, there was a limited impact
on the financial system. There was a small but notable reallocation (3.6 per cent)
of funds away from non-cash financial instruments issued by other banks toward
government-issued instruments. Over the course of six weeks, the maturity of
money-market fund holdings also changed – there was a decline in cash balances
at large banks and a marked shortening of maturities. However, these effects were
managed through complementary actions, including market-making facilities to
ensure liquidity.
There are lessons for bail-in frameworks. The impact on creditors may create
additional financial fragility, particularly when creditors are uncertain about their
exposure to the bank being bailed in. Systemic runs may also occur when the
failure is not believed to be idiosyncratic, leading creditors to believe that bail-ins
may follow in similar banks.
If the authorities had not announced a credible haircut, or if the communication
on the plan had been vague, the withdrawals from money-market funds may well
have been larger, and the rise in redemptions may well in turn have led to the large-
scale withdrawals of funds by money-market funds from other banks, precipitating
a more generalised run. Money-market funds also responded differently depending
on whether gating occurred – funds that chose to use retention funds had relatively
smaller outflows.
The analysis challenged some of the conventional wisdom about the interaction
between wholesale funding and banks. The first is that wholesale funding is more
prone to runs than retail funding. Indeed, the experience of African Bank showed
the contrary. It was predominantly funded by long-dated wholesale funding, and
this arguably reduced the risk of a sudden run on the bank. Indeed, it seems that
wholesale funders slowly reduced their exposure to African Bank by not rolling
over their maturing instruments.
In this case, the bail-in was arguably successful. A failing bank could be partly
recapitalised through imposing losses on creditors. Appropriate complementary
actions, such as discretionary liquidity restrictions and market-making facilities
for short-term paper arguably mitigated further spillovers. The African Bank
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experience suggests that if carefully implemented, bail-in can support a bank
resolution that shares the financial burden between strained fiscal authorities and
creditors.
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Conclusion
Bank failures can have significant economic, financial, political and social conse-
quences. Against the background of the international literature, this study draws
lessons from South African bank failures between 2002 and 2014. In each individual
chapter, lessons from specific episodes were drawn. In this concluding chapter, the
focus is on broader, cross-cutting lessons.
5.1 Economic and financial lessons
The significant economic and financial costs associated with bank failures under-
score the need for strong financial regulation and supervision, a robust financial
stability framework, and appropriate resolution tools.
During the small bank crisis of 2002 to 2003, twenty-two banks closed over
two years, with significant broader macroeconomic effects. The consolidation of
the banking sector led to substantially reduced competition. During and after the
crisis, money supply growth slowed, and liquidity declined. The central bank’s
balance sheet shrunk by a third, from R150 billion to R100 billion, and overall
credit extension growth declined from a three-year high of 15.7 per cent in January
2002 to 11.7 per cent by July of that year. The slowdown in lending experienced
during the first half of 2003 was particularly noticeable in corporate lending, where
many of the failed banks specialised.
The study also highlighted financial market spillover effects. Distress can
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rapidly spread from one bank failure to others. The small bank crisis shared a
number of features with ‘bank panics’ in other jurisdictions, in that the spillover
effects were to other small banks. The chapter demonstrated that this contagion
was through neither overlapping claims nor through information effects. Rather,
there was a general loss of confidence in smaller banks. Banks with more fragile
liability structures, i.e. with short-term wholesale funding, experienced runs. Even
well-capitalised banks with short-term funding structures failed.
Chapter 4 demonstrated that spillover effects could take place through non-
bank financial institutions. This was a key lesson of the 2008 global financial
crisis – when Reserve Primary Fund, a money market fund, broke the buck on
16 September 2008, it contributed to significant damage throughout the financial
system. During the African Bank failure, over fifteen money-market funds broke
the buck and there was a brief run on money market funds. The spillovers were
similar, but substantially more muted.
5.2 Lessons for macroprudential policy
Bank failures impose costs but bank regulations themselves also have economic
consequences – both costs and benefits. Chapter 3 showed that changes to banking
regulatory measures, in this case system-wide capital requirements, have macroe-
conomic and financial stability implications. This was an early use of a ‘macro-
prudential’ tool – a microprudential regulatory tool used with a broader financial
stability goal. The increase in capital adequacy dampened credit growth and
strengthened bank balance sheets, fortuitously ahead of the significant external
shock of the global financial crisis. This demonstrated the usefulness of macro-
prudential tools, particularly the countercyclical capital buffer, in situations where
monetary policy tools are either ineffective or inappropriate.
Macroprudential tools should also be used within a coordinated framework.
For the pre-2008 period, I showed that the decision to increase capital adequacy
ratios was undertaken by the banking supervisor. An analysis of the minutes of
the monetary policy committee and the Monetary Policy Review reveal that the
far-reaching implementation of Basel 2, including the increase in capital adequacy,
was not discussed as a monetary policy issue. Similarly, in chapter 2, I showed
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that institutionally, the Reserve Bank’s own analysis of the 2002/3 small banking
crisis shows that it was viewed as primarily a banking crisis and not a monetary
policy one. The response during the African Bank failure was substantially better
– all divisions of the central bank supported the resolution. Liquidity was made
available to the system; supervision was enhanced on other banks, and there were
no disruptive interest-rate changes.
There is a lesson in this for the institutional structure of a central bank.
The monetary policy setting, monetary policy implementation, banking super-
vision and financial stability functions are not wholly separable functions, but
components of a broader central banking function. As the central bank moves
towards operationalising an explicit financial stability goal, this suggests that
monetary, macroprudential and microprudential policy should not be treated as
clearly delineated, separate areas of central bank policy, but rather as a co-
ordinated set of tools.
5.3 Lessons for monetary policy
The study demonstrated that monetary policy and financial stability are not
mutually exclusive – the stance of monetary policy may often have non-neutral
effects for financial stability.
Credit growth is a well-established warning sign of financial instability. Chap-
ters 2 and 4 highlighted that rapid credit extension in unsecured loans preceded
both the failure of Saambou and African Bank. In the year preceding the small
bank crisis, unsecured personal loans grew by 26.7 per cent per annum; whereas
in the year ahead of the African Bank failure, unsecured loans grew in excess of 10
per cent per annum. Both Saambou and African Bank experienced rapid growth
in loans. A year before its distress became evident, Saambou’s assets grew by 34.8
per cent. Similarly, African Bank’s peaked at 50 per cent per annum.
In chapter 3, I showed that in the years leading into the global financial crisis,
monetary policy and macroprudential policy pulled in different directions. On the
one hand, the central bank reduced the overnight policy rate. On the other, it
raised capital adequacy requirements. The former almost certainly contributed to
rapid growth in credit extension and house price growth, which rose 17.5 and 20.2
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per cent year-on-year on average between 2002 and 2007.
During all three periods, the Reserve Bank communicated that it was uncon-
cerned about the rapid rise in credit. The argument was that inflation remained
low and so a response within the context of a strict ‘Greenspan Standard’ inflation-
targeting framework was not required. During the lead-up to Saambou and African
Bank, there was no macroprudential response – the central bank could have, for
example, raised capital requirements for unsecured loans to dampen this particular
type of lending. Or it could have raised overall capital adequacy requirements to
dampen all lending.
As discussed in chapter 3, for small open economies, monetary policy may
also have mixed effects on credit growth. Increased interest rates may stimulate
capital flows, which would support domestic credit growth. In this scenario,
macroprudential policy is a better tool to manage financial stability effects as
it has limited exchange rate and open economy effects.
5.4 Lessons for responding to failures
The study demonstrated that when banks fail, authorities need a clear and credible
plan.
In each of the periods, the authorities chose a different approach, providing an
opportunity to compare. During the small bank crisis, the policy response to the
runs was inappropriate. While unlimited solvency and liquidity support was given
to the largest failing bank, BOE, a set of smaller banks were not provided with
liquidity support, despite being well capitalised and solvent. They could have been
supported through lender of last resort facilities. The mechanism for such support
was, however, not in place at the time.1 If South Africa is to develop a viable small
banking tier, a clear ex ante liquidity support and deposit insurance scheme will
be important to ensure confidence in smaller banks, particularly during periods of
financial market disturbances.
The small bank crisis took place prior to the 2008 global financial crisis. Many
of the lessons of that crisis (and the small bank crisis) were incorporated into
1More recent reforms, including the introduction of a committed liquidity facility (CLF),
provides an ex ante lender of last resort facility.
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improving the authorities’ response to the African Bank failure in 2014.
Indeed, the response during the failure of African Bank was substantially better
– the resolution plan was extensive, detailed and immediate. Actions were taken
in non-banking components of the financial system – for example, discretionary
liquidity restrictions (a type of gating restriction) were imposed on money-market
funds. Moreover, market making facilities were extended to potentially affected
overnight instruments issued by other banks. If anything the Reserve Bank may
have ‘over-reacted’, with a relatively generous haircut (bonds that were trading
at 66c on the rand were discounted to 90c on the rand). There was also clear
guidance given to the public on the solvency of other banks (particularly Capitec,
which had similar assets but a very different funding profile). The effect was to
forestall spillovers. The authorities’ response to the Saambou and African Bank
failures also highlighted gaps in the legal and regulatory framework. Each of
the failing banks (Saambou and African Bank) understated their non-performing
loans; similarly VBS Mutual Bank appears to have done the same. The list of
bank failures in the appendix highlights how common outright fraud has been in
South African banking failures.
Legislation had to be tabled at short-notice in Parliament to facilitate the
African Bank bail-in (particularly the ability to transfer assets and liabilities to
the ‘good bank’). To facilitate future events, new legislation has recently been
published.
This legislation also introduced a new system of deposit insurance and depositor
preference. I demonstrated, however, that deposit insurance would not have
staunched the run during the small-bank crisis. This is because the affected
liabilities were not retail.
That said, a more important component of recent proposed reforms is to
introduce depositor preference, i.e. that retail depositors rank senior to other
liability holders during liquidation. This will have two benefits – first, it will ensure
that ordinary retail depositors are paid out first from the proceeds of failures; and,
second, it will reduce the implicit exposure of the sovereign.
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5.5 Limitations of the research
Bank failures are relatively rare and have idiosyncratic features, which limit their
usefulness for drawing general conclusions. That said there is a healthy inter-
national literature (as discussed in this study) that shows that individual bank
failures can contribute to a better understanding of the practice of central banking.
Nevertheless, the lessons drawn in this study should be seen in light of the limited
South African experience. Inevitably, future bank failures and financial crises will
have their own unique causes and consequences.
I assembled large data sets for each of the periods I examined. In chapter 2,
the data set comprised new bank-level information on 217 balance sheet items. In
Chapter 3, a new capital adequacy variable was obtained from the regulator and
incorporated into an existing model. In chapter 4, in addition to the publicly-
available industry data set, I assembled two new data sets: one quarterly data set
with financial-instrument level information, and one daily data set.
Such extensive data sets are not readily available, can only be constructed
after the fact, and are often incomplete. This limits the ability to build ongoing
risk monitoring frameworks. In particular, there is a lack of regularly updated
data on interconnectedness – bank failures often propagate through a series of
opaque and misunderstood interlinkages, and there are substantial data gaps. For
example, data could be collected and made available on inter-bank exposures to
better understand linkages.
5.6 Future research
5.6.1 The appropriate tools
This study highlighted the broader role of the central bank in managing periods
of financial market distress and dislocations. I assessed the usefulness of one
policy tool, the counter-cyclical capital buffer. However, the tool has a number
of weaknesses (see, for example, Farrell (2016)). There are a number of other
possible tools that could be used (see the discussion in chapter 2, and Cerutti
et al. (2015); Sinclair and Farrell (2017); Havemann (2013)). These include loan-
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to-value ratios, leverage caps, and time-varying reserve requirements. Further work
at an individual country level and cross country are useful to understand not only
the economic effects, but also the practicalities of using these tools.
The increase in capital adequacy requirements in the pre-2008 period was due
to a generalised increase in credit growth – the Saambou and African Bank cases
were two specific banks that experienced credit growth. It does not necessarily
follow that the appropriate policy response is to impose macroprudential policy
tools on all banks – it may be sufficient to impose them only on affected banks.
5.6.2 Institutional structure
Eichengreen (2014) highlights that historical analyses are useful because they bring
in the institutional context. The decision-making in a central bank is critical –
for example, how decisions are made when there are potential trade-offs between
financial stability and inflation targeting.
Sinclair and Farrell (2017) note that the combination of overheating financial
conditions and low inflation is a period of ‘conflicting’ policy objectives. For South
Africa, they show that monetary policy and macroprudential policy conflicted
as often as 30 per cent of the time. Under the new ‘Twin Peaks’ approach
to financial sector regulation, the Reserve Bank has restructured its decision-
making framework. Monetary policy decisions are made by a monetary policy
committee, while financial stability decisions are made by a financial stability
committee. There are overlapping members. However, more work needs to be
done to understand how the trade-offs might be managed.
For example, I showed in chapter 2 that the monetary policy committee raised
interest rates in the second week of a banking crisis, to dampen inflation. In chapter
3, I outlined some of the considerations in how financial stability and interest-
rate decisions can be made. Further research is needed on how to best structure
decision making in a central bank with a financial stability mandate. This will be
particularly context and jurisdictional specific.2 A review of the literature showed
2In South Africa, there is a natural coordination advantage from having banking supervision
in the central bank. In Europe, monetary policy decisions are made by the European Central
Bank, and macroprudential decisions are made by individual central banks in each jurisdiction.
In Australia, supervisory decisions (such as overall capital adequacy levels) are made by the
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that game theory provides a useful way of thinking through these issues. The
two ‘players’ are the monetary and macroprudential decision makers. Their ‘play’
is respectively interest rate changes or macroprudential policy changes. Future
research could build out on how to improve the coordination of decision making,
and incorporate financial stability measures in monetary policy and vice-versa.
5.6.3 The role of liquidity
The Reserve Bank operates a ‘classical cash reserve’ or ‘liquidity deficit framework’
for the implementation of monetary policy, with the repo rate as the operational
variable. The Reserve Bank sets the overnight rate, and the quantity of money
adjusts (South African Reserve Bank, 2005). This is in contrast with other juris-
dictions that run an open-market system, where open-market operations are used
to achieve a desired interest rate (see, for example Allen et al. (2009) and for a
discussion comparing the systems see Havemann (2013)). However, the critical
disadvantage to the current system appears to be that it makes monitoring and
responding to financial-system liquidity conditions potentially more difficult (Brink
and Kock, 2009).
5.7 Concluding remarks
It has been a decade since the failure of Lehman’s Brothers on 15 September 2008.
Policymakers have grappled with a number of issues in the years since the 2008
global financial crisis. In that period, the immediacy of the crisis led to a number
of substantial reforms, both internationally and domestically. In South Africa,
these reforms included the review of the financial regulatory system to introduce a
‘Twin Peaks’ system, the introduction of a new recovery and resolution framework
for banks, and a deposit insurance scheme.
As that crisis fades from memory, ongoing work is required to ensure that the
system remains robust to both domestic and international shocks. These shocks
may take the form of bank failures or other types of failures.
Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority, while macroprudential and monetary decisions are
made by the Reserve Bank of Australia.
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During the final months of this study, VBS Mutual Bank failed. It was the
first retail deposit bank that failed since the Saambou crisis, sixteen years earlier.
Ordinary South Africans slept outside bank branches during the winter of 2018 to
ensure that they were first in the queue when the bank opened. The largest retail
depositors were community funeral ‘stokvels’, and funerals were delayed while the
bank rescue plan was finalised. This was a repeat of history – when Saambou and
African Bank collapsed, thousands of ordinary people lost their pension savings.
The government intervention could only offer limited help. Governments simply
do not have the significant resources to bail out banks.
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